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The political and religious are demonstrably intertwined in American politics and
within the preferences of individual citizens. This dissertation has attempted to examine
possible theoretical reasons for the overlap and sources of development of these belief
systems within individuals and across generations. In sum, different Moral Foundations are
associated with different preferences for organizing society and approaching religion;
grandparents, parents and children share many political and religious beliefs, though not all
Moral Foundations; and genetics influence part of the variance on religious and political
preferences and part of their overlap is due to a shared genetic path. Most scholarship
exploring the nature of religious and political beliefs divide the world into political liberals
and conservatives or religious modernists and traditionalists, but this dissertation suggests
there may be an even broader orientation that shapes the lens through which individuals
view the world. Whether this orientation is socialized, heritable or a combination of both,
understanding that moral decisions and political and religious preferences shape and are
shaped by this orientation may help explain the “culture wars” in American society (Hunter
1991). Investigating this psychology behind political and religious ideologies will provide
better insight into the reasons people believe and act the way they do as well as
understanding the stability of beliefs across generations and, therefore, of the relative
intractability of people’s positions on controversial issues.
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Chapter 1: Why do political and religious beliefs overlap?
Why are evangelical Christians drawn to conservative policies and American Jews to the
political left? Why do some Lutherans support increased social services while other
Lutherans favor reduced government? Social scientists have long recognized and sought to
explain a connection between religious and political beliefs. Alignment theories, for example,
seek to explain why religious groups associate with American political parties, and individuallevel studies of “believing, behaving and belonging” suggest levels of religious commitment
and orthodoxy co-vary with individual differences in political beliefs (Smidt et. al 2010;
Smidt, Kellstedt, and Guth 2009; Layman 2001; Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2007). Yet, such
frameworks do not provide comprehensive answers to questions of why specific religious
beliefs intersect with specific political beliefs. At least in part, this is because existing
frameworks tend to treat political and religious attitudes as independent concepts and
frequently ignore the origins of these belief systems.
The notion that these belief systems may not be independent, that they may be the
product of common environmental and, especially, biological forces has yet to be fully
integrated into a single, comprehensive theoretical framework. We know that political and
religious socialization occurs in families (Jennings and Niemi 1974; Clark and Worthington
1987; Cornwall 1989), that political and religious traits may be partially heritable (Alford,
Funk and Hibbing 2005; Vance, Maes and Kendler 2010), and that political attitudes
associated with religion are more consistently transmitted from parent to child as compared
to other political items (Jennings, Stoker and Bowers 2009; Tedin 1974; Thomas 1971).
What we do not know is why these belief sets are mutually socialized across generations or
whether they have common biological origins. In short we do not fully understand why or
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how political orientations and religious beliefs co-vary within individuals and across
generations.
Rather than thinking about religious beliefs influencing political attitudes through an
intentional cognitive process (e.g. The Bible says homosexuality is wrong, therefore I oppose
gay marriage), this dissertation examines whether these belief systems overlap because they
both represent an individual’s preferences for “bedrock principles of group life” (Alford,
Funk and Hibbing 2008). My research challenges the traditional view of separate but related
belief sets with a conceptual model that explains both political and religious beliefs as rooted
in the same underlying psychological construct reflecting first principle beliefs on social
organization. A particular contribution of my dissertation is to examine the transmission of
political and religious orientations across more than two generations, and to empirically test
the biological-based heritability of these social attitudes. This contrasts with the general
approach to studying the intergenerational transmission of social attitudes in general and
political attitudes in particular, which is to focus exclusively on socialization, rather than
genetics, as the agent of transmission.
By extending the study of social orientations across three generations (grandparent !
parent ! child), I seek to test the robustness of general inferences drawn from the
socialization literature, and also to better examine whether the notion of biological-based
heritability plays a role in explaining the consistency of political and religious orientations.
To extend the latter study, I will employ a twin data set to explicitly test the hypothesis that
political and religious orientations spring from common genetic influences. In particular, the
focus of the study will be on the covariation of religious and political value sets as they pass
from generation to generation. If intergenerational agreement is occurring with political and
religious attitudes, two value sets with evidence of heritability, what does their combination
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say about whether this transfer is strictly socialization, purely genetic or a combination of
both?
The current chapter provides a theoretical framework to support the claim that political
and religious beliefs share an underlying psychological construct. Rather than suggesting a
causal order between religion and politics, I argue that Jonathan Haidt and Jesse Graham’s
Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) may provide the basis for understanding how a set of first
principles, derived from individual moral judgments, may underlie both political and
religious beliefs within individuals, representing how they wish to organize the world.
Because MFT has not been widely applied to the study of religion (though more so to
politics), I address how this framework relates to the work already being done on the
intersection of religion and American politics and provide two other theoretical frameworks
to represent broad, general beliefs within religion and politics.
After establishing an argument for a common underlying psychological construct that
drives both religious and political beliefs, the second section of this chapter will explain why
bedrock principles and accompanying political and religious belief systems seem stable
across generations. Revisiting the socialization literature suggests that broad, moral
orientations, as opposed to specific issues of the day, are more likely to be transmitted within
families and extending the unit of analysis to include grandparents may demonstrate an even
stronger case for the passage of these beliefs. The final section provides an argument for a
biological basis of religious and political beliefs, especially in the sense of a shared genetic
pathway. The latter is to be expected if, (1) the argument for a common psychological
construct in section two is correct, and (2) political and religious beliefs, as existing empirical
studies suggest, are heritable. These arguments provide the bases for the hypotheses outlined
and tested in the remaining chapters of this dissertation.
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Moral Foundations: Integrating Theories of Religion and Politics
Religious and political belief systems are the primary means by which individuals organize
and understand mass-scale human societies. Political ideology is typically conceptualized as a
coherent set of stable beliefs about group life (Jost 2006, see also Converse 1964) or as
Downs put it, “We define an ideology as a verbal image of the good society and of the chief
means of constructing such a society” (Downs 1957, 96). Religious beliefs likewise provide a
central source of preferences for social rules and order (Hunter 1991; Wuthnow 1988;
Mockabee et al. forthcoming; Emerson and Smith 2000). In terms of social beliefs, those on
the political left place more emphasis on correcting inequality and promoting progressive
social change while those on the right support individuality and maintenance of traditional
values (Jost 2006). Similarly, when it comes to religion and society, American Christians1 on
the theological left emphasize social justice here on earth while the theological right focus on
an individual’s relationship with God and the afterlife (Emerson and Smith 2000; Layman
2001; Hunter 1991; Smidt, Kellstedt and Guth 2009; Wuthnow 1988; Balzer and Wagner,
forthcoming). Traditionally, the religious and the political have been treated as separate but
related realms – institutionally, across society and within individuals. But there is clear
evidence that these belief systems have shared elements that may point to individuals
possessing a single underlying predisposition toward the organization of society. At the very
least, individuals may draw upon similar bedrock principles in forming their religious and
political preferences.
Moral Foundations and Political Attitudes. Evidence for a set of common, underlying
dispositional traits that influence both political and religious beliefs is found in Moral
Foundations Theory. Jonathan Haidt and Jesse Graham (2007) identify five dimensions that
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
U!This dissertation will focus on Christianity as its primary religious system as it is the overwhelming majority
religion in the United States.
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provide the basis for most moral decision-making across cultures: Harm/Care,
Fairness/Reciprocity, Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, and Purity/Sanctity. Individual
scores on these dimensions are calculated based upon answers to a battery of questions, such
as “when you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what extent are the following
considerations relevant to your thinking?”2
•
•
•
•
•

Whether or not someone suffered emotionally (Harm)
Whether or not some people were treated differently than others (Fairness)
Whether or not someone’s action showed love for his or her country (Loyalty)
Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect for authority (Authority)
Whether or not someone did something disgusting (Purity)

Scoring on the dimensions are calculated by the degree of relevance that an individual rates
each statement – “This consideration has nothing to do with my judgments of right and
wrong” through “This is one of the most important factors when I judge right and wrong.”
McAdams et al. (2008, 984-985) provide a nice summary of the basic values undergirding
each Moral Foundation:
•

(a) Harm-Care (it is wrong to hurt people; it is good to relieve suffering);

•

(b) Fairness-Reciprocity (justice and fairness are good; people have certain rights that
need to be upheld in social interactions);

•

(c) In-group-Loyalty (people should be true to the group and be wary of threats from
the outside; allegiance, loyalty, and patriotism are all virtues; betrayal is bad);

•

(d) Authority-Respect (people should respect social hierarchy; social order is
necessary for human life);

•

(e) Purity-Sanctity (the body and certain aspects of life are sacred; cleanliness and
health, as well as their derivatives of chastity and piety, are all good; dirt, pollution,

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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A complete list of questions and the answer key can be found at www.moralfoundations.org.
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contamination, and the associated character traits – lust, gluttony, and greed – are all
bad).
When applied to the political spectrum, ideological liberals and conservatives both rely

upon Harm and Fairness intuitions in moral judgments, but conservatives also endorse
notions of Loyalty, Authority and Purity in their decisions (Graham, Haidt and Nosek 2009).
This partially explains why liberals and conservatives seem to talk past one another –
Fairness and Harm usually outweigh the other moral considerations for liberals whereas
conservatives rely on all five dimensions equally. Extending individual moral decisionmaking to political attitudes, Koleva, Graham, Haidt, Iyer, and Ditto (2012) discover that the
Moral Foundations are predictive of certain “culture war” issues (Hunter 1991) that are
often grounded in religious beliefs. These types of issues – abortion, gay marriage, the death
penalty – polarize Americans, both politically and religiously (Hunter 1991; Wuthnow 1988;
Carmines and Layman 1997; Carmines and Stimson 1989; Layman 2001). A common thread
underlying this culture divide is a general set of preferences on social order and behavior. On
one side are orthodox individuals who believe in unchanging moral codes emanating from
an authoritative source while progressives adhere to an ever-evolving understanding of the
human condition and associated morality (Koleva et al. 2012; Hunter 1991). Orthodox folks
may cling to the Constitution (politically), the Bible (religiously) and tradition as a way to
solve society’s ills, and progressives advocate a “modern, secular, or relativist position” to
address ever-changing circumstances (Koleva et al. 2012 185).
Using all five Moral Foundations as independent variables, Koleva et al. (2012) predicted
participants’ personal disapproval of the culture war issues, with Harm and Purity
demonstrating the strongest relationships. Purity was associated with disagreement on sexual
issues (e.g. casual sex and same-sex marriage) as well as “sanctity of life” issues (e.g. stem-cell
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research and abortion) (Koleva et al. 2012), and Harm was associated with disapproval of the
death penalty and medical testing of animals.
Moral Foundations and Religiosity. The Moral Foundations framework seems to offer a
natural extension into the study of religion, but up until recently, it has mostly been applied
to political attitudes and behavior. In the Durkheim tradition of religion as moral
community, Graham and Haidt (2010, 140) argue that moral foundations theory provides a
more comprehensive understanding of religiosity in that it moves beyond isolated, individual
belief to capture the “group-focused ‘binding’ foundations of Ingroup/Loyalty,
Authority/Respect, Purity/Sanctity.” The dimensions of Fairness and avoiding Harm are
certainly important aspects of most religions, but they focus more on individual people and
human rights whereas the other three foundations serve in “limiting autonomy and selfexpression to bind people into emergent social entities” (Graham and Haidt 2010, 144).
Theoretically, the five moral foundations seem to be present in most religions or religious
groups, but this doesn’t necessarily mean that each religious person draws upon each
intuition equally when making moral decisions.
Similar to the findings about political conservatives and liberals, McAdams et al. (2008)
identified left-right differences in how highly religious, highly political people described their
beliefs. Using autobiographical narrative study, Christian individuals in the study were asked
to explain the content, development and salience of their “religious-moral beliefs” in
response to open-ended questions (McAdams et al. 2008, 985). The authors then coded the
narratives for references to the five Moral Foundations, assigning a level of concern score
for each individual on each dimension. Harm/Care and Fairness/Reciprocity were negatively
correlated with the other three foundations, though they were not significantly related to
each other. When the Moral Foundation scores were separately regressed on self-reported
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political ideology and Right Wing Authoritarianism, conservatives were more likely than
liberals to describe affinity for the community-binding intuitions (Ingroup/Loyalty,
Authority/Respect, and Purity/Sanctity) whereas liberals demonstrated more concern for
individual rights (Harm/Care and Fairness/Reciprocity) than conservatives, holding
demographic variables constant. These findings and the negative relationship between the
individual rights and community-binding dimensions suggest personal narratives to openended questions about religious faith match up with past findings on liberal-conservative
answers to general moral dilemmas in the Moral Foundations question battery (Graham,
Haidt and Nosek 2009). These findings strongly suggest that political and religious beliefs are
shaped by the same set of broad intuitions—specifically a set of underlying bedrock
principles reflecting preferences for social order. This underlines the need to rethink
traditional accounts of the two as separate orientations, which will be supported further by
examining the evidence of overlapping belief systems within the Moral Foundations
framework.
The Intersection of Religion and Politics
Rather than investigating whether religious and political beliefs are rooted in the
same psychological predispositions, scholars have been more interested in developing
measures of how these beliefs systems relate, especially in the United States. For the past 20
years, most of these studies have approached religion and politics with three key
measurements of religiosity – believing, behaving and belonging – that help to classify
traditionalists and modernists (Stark and Finke 2000; Layman 2001). Religious traditionalists
tend to report having a born-again experience, believe in a literal translation of the Bible, and
ascribe to orthodox beliefs, while mainline Protestants or religious modernists, usually
belonging to Methodist, Episcopalian, or Presbyterian churches, usually do not view the
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Bible as the literal word of God and focus more on social justice issues on earth rather than
an emphasis on personal salvation and the afterlife (Steensland et al. 2000; Smith 1990;
Layman 2001; Smidt, Kellstedt and Guth 2009). Thinking in Moral Foundations terms,
religious traditionalists are more likely to emphasize Authority, Purity and Loyalty in their
moral judgments, along with Fairness and Harm, whereas modernists will mostly emphasize
Fairness and Harm, or the dimensions related to protecting individuals/social justice.
Specific religious beliefs, such as being born again or believing in a literal translation
of the Bible, have been connected to specific political issue attitudes like gay marriage and
abortion as well as more general ideological leanings (Layman 2001; Wuthnow 1988;
Mockabee at al. forthcoming; Emerson and Smith 2000). In keeping with the focus on
general, non-culture specific preferences, the current study is interested in broader religious
beliefs that are more likely to correspond to an underlying predisposition. Furthermore,
some scholars have argued that specific measures of orthodoxy bias results toward
conservative Protestants as these behaviors and beliefs are more tied to those traditions than
other faith communities (Mockabee, Monson and Grant 2001; Mockabee, Wald and Leege,
forthcoming). For example, a devout Catholic would most likely not consider herself born
again and would thus score lower on a religiosity scale. Use of broader political and religious
measures may better capture the bedrock principle argument since both the religious right
and left will be represented. Referred to as individualists and communitarians, the
delineation may best be summarized by whether individuals believe being a Christian is more
about “personal piety or serving others” (Mockabee et al. forthcoming, 2). For the former,
society works best when people are responsible for their own problems, while the latter
emphasize the role of the community in addressing the needs of all (Leege 1988). In addition
to asking traditional questions of church attendance and religious salience, Mockabee et al.
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(forthcoming) included the following on the 2006 and 2008 American National Election
Study:
•

Have there been times in your life when you tried to be a good Christian, or is that
not something you have tried to do?
o [If “yes”] When you have tried to be a good Christian, which did you try to
do more: avoid doing sinful things yourself, or help other people?

A factor analysis of these religious items revealed an individual piety dimension for
attendance and salience and a communitarian dimension for trying to help others more than
avoiding sin. Challenging the “God gap” notion that higher levels of religiosity are always
associated with Republican Party identification and conservative issue attitudes, Mockabee et
al. (forthcoming) found those scoring higher on the communitarian dimension were
significantly less likely to be Republican and held more liberal positions on abortion, gay
rights and women’s role in society than those who were less communitarian. The individual
piety dimension demonstrated the opposite effects, or conservative responses to these social
issues. When testing social welfare attitudes, communitarians also were significantly
associated with liberal preferences for government health care, universal health care, and
government aid to blacks.
By definition, it would seem that Mockabee et al.’s individualist classification would
correspond with the individual rights dimensions of Moral Foundations Theory (Harm and
Fairness) and the communitarian to the community-binding concerns (Loyalty, Authority
and Purity). But these relationships are exactly the opposite. Liberal Christians and liberal
clergy (Graham, Haidt and Nosek 2009) draw upon Fairness/Reciprocity and Harm/Care in
reference to protecting individuals and granting rights; whereas religious individualism refers
more to a person’s concern with his own piety and relationship to God. Communitarian
values, such as helping others when trying to be a better Christian, differ from community-
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binding foundations in that the former seems to be proactive community-building rather
than a restrictive set of rules to limit selfishness for the sake of the community. Thus,
individuals may rely upon different combinations of the Moral Foundations to bind them
within moral communities. Political liberals, religious modernists and communitarians may
see Fairness/Reciprocity and Harm/Care manifested as social justice that corrects
inequalities and protects the vulnerable in order to bind the community through compassion.
Therefore, they support abortion, women’s and gay rights as a matter of fairness and health
care provisions and aid to blacks as protecting marginalized citizens from harm. In this way,
they are freeing individuals from societal structures (e.g. institutional racism) that inhibit their
ability to succeed in life (Emerson and Smith 2000).
Conversely, political conservatives, religious traditionalists and individualists believe
reliance on Authority/Respect, Purity/Sanctity, and Ingroup/Loyalty are necessary for
society to function properly. Therefore, these individuals may oppose challenges to
traditional family structures manifested through abortion, gay rights and women’s roles in
society. The relationship to social welfare attitudes is less clear. According to McAdams et al.
(2008) and Graham, Haidt and Nosek (2009), fairness and harm concerns are not as salient
as the other three foundations for politically conservative religious people, but Haidt,
Graham, and Nosek (2009) also have established across several studies that all five
dimensions matter to political conservatives. This suggests that political conservatives, at
least in the United States, may separate their economic issue preferences from their religious
beliefs or have a different interpretation of Fairness/Reciprocity, at least when applied to
government intervention.
Because political scientists argue that social welfare/government intervention on
behalf of the poor is now associated with racial attitudes (Carmines and Stimson 1989), it is
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helpful to examine Emerson and Smith’s (2000) work on religion, racism and inequality. In
matters of race relations, they suggest that white American evangelicals (who would fit the
classifications of conservative, traditionalist and individualist) are more likely to support
individual change and interpersonal relationships over societal change. That is, the way to
solve the problem of racism is for individuals to be kind when they encounter others of
another race and for blacks to take responsibility for their own welfare, rather than relying
upon the government to correct past wrongs or try to alter current societal structures.
Though the spirit of individualism is common among all Americans, Emerson and Smith
argue that white evangelicals adhere more strongly to the notion of individual freewill,
unhampered by societal structures or cultural traditions, as it ties directly into their religious
worldview. One’s personal relationship with God is of the utmost importance, and thus
relationships with one’s family, friends and acquaintances are how one affects change in the
world. Individuals are completely responsible for their misdeeds; blaming the system is
evading personal accountability. Furthermore, individuals are inherently flawed and thus
need laws from God (Authority) to teach them how to live (e.g. Purity) in community with
one another. Thus, racism is a personal sin from which certain individuals need to repent
and constructing laws or proactively reversing the effects of racism are unnecessary and
usually ineffective. Only repentance and Christian conversion can change the world. This
comports with Graham and Haidt’s (2010) community-binding theory that individuals need
Authority, Purity and Ingroup intuitions to limit autonomy and corral selfish desires.
In summary, division along the five Moral Foundations may explain both political
and religious differences. With the same dispositional traits influencing both belief sets, it is
not surprising that religion and politics have been strongly related, especially in a highly
religious advanced democracy like the United States where people are free to choose both
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their religion and their politics. A common underlying disposition also helps explain why
both religious and political beliefs are successfully transmitted across generations, as all three
belief systems may mutually reinforce one another. This transmission is not automatic and
often falters with specific attitudes, causing some scholars to argue that early life experiences
are not as important as adult socialization. As argued above, however, specific issue attitudes
will change depending on the cultural context, but broad dispositions like Moral
Foundations or society works best preferences may be more likely to run in families.
Generational Transmission of Political and Religious Beliefs
Arguing for a single, underlying psychological construct may be aided by looking for
evidence that religious and political beliefs are the kinds of traits that are consistently shared
across generations. The socialization literature notes that the most successful transmission
corresponds to “when the parents’ political views are crystallized, stable, and communicated
via consistent cues over long stretches of time” (Jennings, Stoker and Bowers 2009, 788).
After children had left the home, Jennings and Niemi (1974) found the strongest parentchild agreement on political preferences that had religious components associated with
emotion and tradition. Most socialization scholars explain these results with the powerful,
consistent parental cues that often accompany moral issue attitudes (Jennings, Stoker and
Bowers 2009; Tedin 1974; Thomas 1971). In short, the general approach has been to treat
inter-generational transmission of coupled political/religious belief as an intentional
cognitive process driven by purposive socialization. The same evidence, however, is also
perfectly consistent with the idea that these belief systems overlap because they both
represent a broader set of predispositions manifested as preferences for social order. If these
predispositions are transmitted across generations, it logically follows that political and
religious beliefs would also be passed down.
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Regardless of the particular conceptual perspective, however, it is not completely clear

that the transmission of political and religious beliefs, let alone any common underlying
psychological construct, is a truly multi-generational phenomenon. In political science, the
socialization research paradigm began with the study of dyadic parent-child observations that
assumed parents begin their political lives at marriage. As a result the birth of subsequent
children and the potential influence of previous generations have been largely ignored.
Thirty-five years ago, Beck and Jennings (1975) proposed that parents are not originators of
what political content may or may not be passed on to children; rather, they serve as
“middlepersons” who transmit the partisanship and attitudes they may have acquired from
their own parents. Since this time, the parental socialization agenda has marched on with
updated panel studies, numerous replications and continued insight into exactly how political
attitudes and behaviors are transmitted in families (Zuckerman, Dasovi!, and Fitzgerald
2007; Jennings, Stoker and Bowers 2009; Stoker and Jennings 2008; Beck and Jennings
1991), yet the conceptualization of parents as “middlepersons” seems to have been lost.
Understanding whether parents serve as value relays between generations may shed light on
socialization processes as well as provide evidence for the genetic influence of shared
preferences. For example, the homogeneity of partisanship between mothers and fathers is
“the strongest and most consistent of factors predicting parent-child similarity” and serves as
a “multiplier effect” in the socialization process (Jennings and Niemi 1974, 154, 156).
Because political agreement is greater in dual- rather than single parent households, Jennings
and Niemi conclude that it is the presence of two complementary cue-giving sources that
reinforce partisan transmission. This consistent cue-giving effect extends to agreement
between parents and teachers and parents and peers, suggesting that the lack of
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disharmonious messages within an individual’s social network strengthens the likelihood of
successful parent-child transmission.
If this is the case, what happens if we add grandparents? In other words, should we take
the concept of parents as “middle persons” seriously and treat inter-generational
transmission as something more than a parent-child dyad? Will the addition of
intergenerational homogeneity increase this multiplier effect? In families where parents come
from different partisan backgrounds, one parent often changes his or her mind in agreement
with the other, which results in children sharing party affiliation with one set of grandparents
and not the other (Beck and Jennings 1975). But the multiplier effect of homogenous
parental agreement suggests homogeneity of grandparents on both sides would generate an
even stronger chance at successful transmission. It is not necessarily the case that
grandparents influence the politics of grandchildren first-hand through something like
frequent political discussion, though this may be a possibility in some families. It is more
likely that political attitudes are passed from generation to generation in a series of “linked
family relationships,” similar to the likelihood of grandparent-grandchild interaction (Mueller
and Elder 2003, 405; Monserud 2008). Because most political socialization within families
seems to be “low-key and haphazard” (Jennings and Niemi 1974, 330), the transmission of
bedrock principles may be more consistent than even partisanship or attitudes on issues of
the day, as they reflect a more general psychological orientation that may influence political
and religious beliefs. If there is a shared psychological construct between religious and
political beliefs, which types of measures will best capture this relationship? Preliminary
evidence for these innate dispositions has been established in behavioral genetics and can
point us to measures that may best capture the latent bedrock principles undergirding the
intersection of the political and religious.
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Why Do Religious and Political Beliefs Co-vary?
Though political science traditionally treats behavior and attitudes as products of
purposive political socialization from parents, peers and schools (Jennings and Niemi 1974;
Jennings, Stoker and Bowers 2009; Zuckerman, Dasovi!, and Fitzgerald 2007), Alford, Funk
and Hibbing’s (2005) work on the heritability of political attitudes challenged this
environmental determinism and launched numerous studies demonstrating that political
orientations, beliefs, interest and participation are at least partially heritable and can be linked
to specific genes (Hatemi et al. 2007; Settle et al. 2008; Fowler and Dawes 2008). Heritability
studies do not argue for biological determinism, but indicate that genetics explain some
portion of the variance in the transmission of political items across generations. Numerous
heritability studies of religiosity have also demonstrated genetic influence that provides a
helpful starting point in determining which measures of religiosity may share genetic variance
with, and therefore psychological underpinnings of, political attitudes. What follows is a brief
outline of the behavior genetics findings on religious attitudes and behavior, which will be
explicated and expanded in Chapter 4.
Though a common social scientific measure of religiosity, religious affiliation or
belonging seems to be more a product of nurture than nature (Eaves, Martin and Heath
1990; Bouchard and McGue 2003), and the heritability studies for church attendance have
been mixed, from minimal to substantial genetic effects (Truett 1992; Bradshaw and Ellison
2008). The strongest heritability findings have been for specific religious beliefs (such as
being born again) and the influence of religious beliefs in one’s life (Bradshaw and Ellison
2008; Bouchard et al. 1999). Bradshaw and Ellison (2008) suggest that higher genetic effects
for individual beliefs and religious orientations versus outward religious behavior
demonstrate that private actions may be motivated more by predispositions and the latter by
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social influences. Though the internal/external divide on behavior may delineate heritability
and environmental causes, some scholars have suggested motivational differences for these
behaviors are partially genetic and may better explain individual approaches to religiosity.
Bouchard et al. (1999) examined the heritability of intrinsic and extrinsic religious
motivations, measures with a rich history in the psychology of religion research tradition
(Gorsuch and McPherson 1989). Those who view religion as what it can do for them are
extrinsically motivated and answer affirmatively to statements like “What religion offers me
most is comfort in times of trouble and sorrow,” while intrinsically motivated individuals are
more likely to say, “My whole approach to life is based upon my religion” (Gorsuch and
McPherson 1989, 352). Using these statements in addition to the full intrinsic/extrinsic
scales on twins raised apart, Bouchard et al. (1999, 96) found a “modest degree of genetic
influence” and confirmed that there are at least two dimensions of religiosity. They suggest
that “the extrinsically motivated person uses his religion, whereas the intrinsically motivated
person lives his religion” (Allport and Ross 1967, 434), indicating that individuals may be
approaching religious belief and behavior using different psychological processes.
In fact, the I/E indices have been extended to non-religious orientations, such as belief
and motivation in the Communist Party in the USSR, and predict similar social attitudes
found with the I/E studies on American Christians (McFarland 1998). Though McFarland’s
(1998) study did not use behavior genetics, extending these phenotypes across cultures and
from religion to politics provides support for an I/E genotype that is dependent or
“activated” by one’s environment. For example, certain individuals may have a psychological
propensity to approach life based on an organized set of beliefs, and whether this manifests
in a religion, political party or something else depends upon where they were born, how they
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were raised and what they encounter as adults. Some individuals will become political, some
religious, some both and some neither.
One of the most comprehensive studies of behavioral genetics and religiosity found
significant genetic effects for all seven of their dimensions of religiosity (Vance, Maes and
Kendler 2010; Kendler et al. 2003, 498):
•

General religiosity: personal concern with spiritual issues and interaction with
God daily and in difficult times.

•

Social religiosity: church attendance and relationships with other religious
individuals.

•

An involved God: belief in a higher power that intervenes in human lives.

•

Forgiveness/love: an individual’s tendency toward love and forgiveness to those
around them.

•

God as judge: belief in God as a “punitive” authority.

•

Unvengefulness: an individual’s tendency against revenge and retaliation.

•

Thankfulness: individual “feelings of thankfulness versus anger toward life and
God.”

In a standard factor analysis of 78 religious questions, Kendler et al. (2003) identified the
above seven factors of religiosity. But when these factors were entered into a multivariate
behavior genetic analysis, results revealed that, “one common genetic factor affects the
predisposition to become religious, whereas unique environmental factors shape the
specificity of how religiosity phenotypes are expressed” (Vance, Maes and Kendler 2010,
759). In this way, religious attitudes may or may not intersect with overlap or influence
political beliefs, depending on the environment. If political elites are not tapping into
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religious frames (Snow et al. 1986) or individuals are simply unengaged in politics – or
religion -- there may be very little overlap between the two realms.
In one of the few studies of political-religious genetic relationships, Bouchard (2009,
169; Koenig and Bouchard 2006) provides an empirical basis for this explanation by arguing
for the presence of a “Traditional Moral Values Triad” (TMVT), which includes the
following:
•

Authoritarianism (How families should be organized)

•

Religiousness (Who controls the universe)

•

Conservatism (How societies should be organized)

These items strongly correlate, replicate across studies and demonstrate strong heritability
effects. Bouchard explains this phenomenon, “Traditionalism,” as the evolutionary
adaptiveness toward obedience and respect for authority, aspects of social organization that
are foundational to both theology and ideology. Bouchard offers a theoretical and empirical
base for a genetic connection that seems to tap into the Moral Foundation of
Authority/Respect, and possibly Ingroup/Loyalty, demonstrating that individuals who
believe in a strict religious moral code also enforce a strict code in their homes and expect a
similar orientation in society.
What is left unexamined is whether intrinsic/extrinsic motivation and
external/internal belief are related to constructs like the Moral Foundations, the religious
individualist/communitarian dimension and religious traditionalist/modernist classifications.
Demonstrating empirical relationships between these items may aid in developing a more
integrated theory of religion and politics that allows for the possibility of a primary
predisposition toward ordering the world. Examining an individual’s familial heritage of
religious and political leanings will provide a starting point of understanding what types of
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political and religious beliefs tend to move together and a behavior genetic analysis could
reveal a shared genetic path between some of these belief sub-sets, explaining both how and
why religion and politics connect.
Summary
Understanding the psychology behind belief will provide a more comprehensive
explanation of the intersection of religion and politics and what this means for
understanding human behavior. Religion’s influence on political attitudes and behaviors, in
the U.S. and in much of the world, is well known. What is unknown is whether these belief
systems overlap because they are generated from the same root cause. Addressing these
unknowns has the potential to provide insight into the origins of political ideology, the
stability of beliefs across generations, and the relative intractability of many controversial
issues. If political and religious beliefs share common, underlying principles within
individuals, it may be possible for those that disagree religiously to speak to one another in
political terms and vice versa, leading to more productive political discussions, policy debates
and possibly political compromise. In addition, there has been a long-standing tension
between religion and the academy, and establishing a common psychological basis for
organizing society and understanding reality may also help the dialogue between scholars and
people of faith. Finally, uncovering a set of bedrock principles that may manifest themselves
in different ways politically and religiously may lead to better communication across
generations, within communities and throughout the political sphere.
The remaining chapters of this dissertation will describe and test hypotheses generated
from the above arguments. Using a sample of undergraduate students, Chapter 2 will
investigate the relationships between bedrock principles, political attitudes and religious
beliefs within individuals to determine whether Moral Foundations serve as underlying traits
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for the other two belief systems. Chapter 3 expands this sample to the parents and
grandparents of the students, in a three-generation dataset, to examine the transmission of
these belief sets within families. In Chapter 4, a twin study will be used to test whether
religious and political beliefs share a genetic path, and Chapter 5 will provide a discussion of
the results and implications of the findings.
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Chapter 2: Moral Foundations:
Integrating Theories of Religion and Politics
Rather than thinking about religious beliefs influencing political attitudes through an
intentional cognitive process, this chapter empirically examines whether these belief systems
overlap because they both represent an underlying psychological construct reflecting first
principle beliefs on social organization. Drawing on the discussion and theoretical arguments
in Chapter 1, this chapter examines two core hypotheses regarding the systematic
relationship between the various dimensions of Moral Foundations theory and political and
religious orientations.
Using three original datasets, there is evidence that Haidt and Graham’s Moral
Foundations of Ingroup, Authority and Purity help to explain an individualist orientation
toward society that manifests itself in conservative political beliefs and religious salience and
beliefs like being born again and believing in the Bible as the literal word of God.
Furthermore, the Moral Foundations of Fairness and Harm are associated with liberal
political views and a communitarian religious orientation that emphasizes helping others
more than simply avoiding personal wrongdoing. In this way, Moral Foundations may help
to guide which types of religious and political beliefs into which individuals select. If the
Foundations are underlying both kinds of beliefs, this may help explain why the religious and
the political tend to intersect and reflect systematic preference orientations – in this case
individualist versus communitarian – for ordering and understanding society. The following
hypotheses outline the nature of these relationships to be tested within this chapter.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 2.1: Higher scores on Ingroup, Authority and Purity foundations are positively
associated with individualist religious measures and conservative political views. Political liberals more
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often rely on the Moral Foundations of Harm and Fairness than Ingroup, Authority and
Purity; whereas political conservatives rely on all five (Graham, Haidt and Nosek 2009;
Koleva et al. 2012). When examining these preferences among religious individuals, the
relationships remain the same for political liberals but political conservatives show more
concern for Ingroup, Authority and Purity than the other two (McAdams et al. 2008;
Graham, Haidt and Nosek 2009). Furthermore, Graham and Haidt (2010) argue that these
latter three Foundations serve to bind moral communities as they limit selfish behavior,
which may also extend to individuals’ political beliefs. That is, those who view individuals as
fundamentally flawed and in need of external rules most likely rely upon Ingroup, Authority
and Purity concerns and would thus support more conservative policies that protect from
outgroups, respect a rigid moral code and adhere to traditional notions of sexual purity. This
individualist approach also may encompass how people approach religion and may be best
captured by individual piety measures, such as being born again, the importance of religion
in one’s life and beliefs on the nature of the Bible (Mockabee et al. forthcoming).
Hypothesis 2.2: Higher scores on Harm and Fairness will be associated with liberal political views
and selection of “helping others” as the means to living more religiously. Conversely, individuals who are
more concerned with Harm and Fairness in their moral judgments see the “system,” rather
than individuals, as problematic, and it is up to the community to ensure that justice and
equality are upheld to bind moral and political communities. Thus, instead of being
concerned with one’s own religious salvation, relationship to God and a fixed moral code,
these individuals view religion as fundamentally aimed at actively helping other people, not
hoping that simply avoiding personal wrongdoing will result in a healthy community.
Politically, these individuals favor government intervention on behalf of those in need but
are not interested in legislating personal morality.
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Sample and Methods
In January 2011, undergraduates at a Midwestern university were sent an email
inviting them to participate in an online survey about religion and politics. The invitation
included a link to Qualtrics.com where individuals completed the 20-minute survey in
exchange for course credit. The survey was repeated in September 2011 by having students
take the survey at a computer lab on campus. The total sample included 583 subjects, after
dropping those who did not complete the entire questionnaire, foreign students3, three
participants whose ages (greater than 45) indicated they were not representative of this
population and 75 individuals who did not “pass” the survey accuracy check detailed below.
The sample is split almost equally between genders (281 males, 302 females), with an average
age of 19.5 years and a median family income of $80,001 to $100,000. Ninety-six percent of
participants are single, 93% identify as white/Caucasian and there is a fair division between
those who grew up on a rural farm (16%), in a rural town (23%), in a suburban (29%) or
urban area (28%).
In order to create a three-generation sample, the spring 2011 subjects were asked to
voluntarily provide the names and addresses of their parents and grandparents; after
receiving a National Science Foundation grant for the project, the fall 2011 subjects were
given $5 for providing this same information. A professional survey organization was
contracted to design and mail surveys to the parents of the subjects. In the first mailing, a
self-addressed stamped envelope and $2 were included as a thank you incentive for
completing the questionnaire. A few weeks later, a second copy of the survey was mailed to
those who had not yet returned the questionnaire. At the end of this survey, the parent
subjects were asked to provide contact information for their parents. This information was
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
V!The religious and political questions in the survey are based upon the U.S. system, culture and society and
may not be applicable to individuals from other nations.
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combined with the grandparent names and addresses already obtained from the student
subjects, and the grandparents were mailed surveys, with a self-addressed stamped envelope
and a $2 incentive (Warriner et al. 1996). A few weeks later, a second copy of the survey was
mailed. These series of surveys were mailed, completed and returned between November
2011 and February 2012. With a 64% response rate, the parent sample included 227
individuals, which were 53% female and 99% white, with an average age of 50.41, a median
income of $80,001 to $100,000 and median education of “college graduate.” The
grandparent sample contains 102 individuals, a 67% response rate, which was 68% female
and 99% white, with an average age of 73.25, a median income of $60,001 to $80,000 and
median education of “some college.” Coding and explanation of the key variables are listed
below, with summary statistics displayed in Table 1.
Moral Foundations. A 20-item questionnaire was used to measure an individual’s Moral
Foundations’ scores (www.moralfoundations.org). For the first set of items, participants
were asked to rate statements from “not at all relevant” (1) to “extremely relevant” (5) to
whether the consideration in question influences their judgments of right and wrong. Two
statements are tied to each of the five Moral Foundations, with examples listed below:
•
•
•
•
•

Harm – “Whether or not someone suffered emotionally”
Fairness – “Whether or not some people were treated differently than others”
Ingroup – “Whether or not someone did something to betray his or her group”
Authority – “Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect for authority”
Purity – “Whether or not someone violated standards of purity and decency”

This set also included an item, which tested for accuracy and full use of the scale: “Whether
or not someone was good at math.” Thirty-six individuals scored a four (“somewhat
relevant”) or above and were dropped from the analysis. The second set of questions
provided a list of statements with which participants were asked to indicate their degree of
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agreement – “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (6). Example statements for each
Foundation are listed below (the full instrument is listed in Appendix A):
•
•
•
•
•

Harm – “Compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial virtue.”
Fairness – “Justice is the most important requirement for a society.”
Ingroup – “I am proud of my country’s history.”
Authority – “Respect for authority is something all children need to learn.”
Purity – “People should not do things that are disgusting, even if no one is harmed.”

This list also contained an item response check --“It is better to do good than to do bad” –
and individuals who slightly disagreed through strongly disagreed were dropped. When
combined with the math item, a total of 75 participants were removed from this measure.4
Because of the small sample size from the parent and grandparent generations, individuals
were only removed from analysis if they “inaccurately” marked both the math and good
items; this resulted in dropping one case in the parent sample and zero cases in the
grandparent sample. Conforming to Haidt and Graham’s coding scheme,5 the scores for the
four statements per Moral Foundation were averaged.
Political Preferences. Smith et al. (2011, 381) developed a “society works best” (SWB) index
to tap a psychological construct argued to be the basis of political ideology by addressing
“the core dilemmas facing all mass-scale societies.” Individuals select among a forced choice
on statements, such as “Society works best when leaders are obeyed OR when leaders are
questioned” to “Society works best when we take care of our own people first OR we realize
people everywhere deserve our help.” With this battery, Smith et al. (2011) identified the
following five factors:
• Traditional values/moral codes
• Outgroups/rulebreakers
• Leadership
• Role of group/individual
• Absolutes
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
W!Dropping these cases did not substantially alter the demographic make-up of this sample.
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The first three dimensions demonstrated strong bivariate relationships with the WilsonPatterson index, a battery of attitudes toward specific issues like abortion and welfare
spending, and all five dimensions were significantly associated with self-placement on an
ideological scale (extremely liberal to extremely conservative). Though never tested
empirically, these societal dimensions appear to theoretically overlap with key elements of
the Moral Foundations; both address the role of the group, how justice should be served,
orientations toward authority or leadership and deference to traditional values. Each of the
12 items was coded -1 for the more liberal position (e.g. “Society works best when people
assume that all those in far away places are kindly”) and 1 for the more conservative answer
(e.g. “Society works best when people realize the world is dangerous”); see Appendix A for
the full instrument. The items were added together to create a SWB index to test bivariate
relationships with the other key measures.
Religious Preferences. In addition to a range of common religious questions detailed below,
a measure was employed to try to capture bedrock principles underlying other religious
beliefs. Already tested on the American National Election Study, the following question
coupling taps into the communitarian aspect of religiosity (Mockabee et al. forthcoming). If
participants answered in a previous question that they considered themselves a Christian,
they received the following questions:6
•

Have there been times in your life when you tried to be a good Christian, or is that
not something you have tried to do?
o Yes, have tried
o No, have not tried
o Don’t know

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6

This question was repeated, with appropriate wording, for participants who selected Jewish or Muslim as their
religious identity. There were no Muslims in this sample. There were only three Jewish participants, who will be
excluded from the analyses at this point.
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o [If “yes”] When you have tried to be a good Christian, which did you try to
do more: avoid doing sinful things yourself, or help other people?
! Avoid sin
! Help others
! Don’t know

Ninety-three percent of the Christians in the student sample indicated they have tried to be a
good Christian, 3% said they have not tried and 4% answered, “don’t know.” Of those who
answered, “yes,” 39% selected avoiding sin, 58% chose helping others and 3% answered,
“don’t know” as to which actions they attempted in trying to be a better Christian. The
parent and grandparent samples included similar proportions, with the percentage choosing
“avoid sin” slightly higher in each generation. A dichotomous variable, communitarian, was
generated from the above questions coded 1 for “help others” and 0 for “avoid sin.”
The survey also inquired about the importance of religion in one’s daily life, whether
one has had a born again experience and feelings about the Bible. Regarding the importance
of religion in day-to-day living, participants could select from “religious beliefs are not an
important part of your life” (1) to “religious beliefs provide a great deal of guidance in your
day-to-day living” (4). The parent and grandparent generations leaned more heavily toward
religion providing a great deal of guidance than the student generation. If indicated in a
previous question that one considers oneself a Christian, participants were asked follow-up
questions about being born again and feelings on the Bible. The proportion of individuals in
the categories of born again, not born again and don’t know were very similar in all three
samples. This variable is coded 1 for born again and 0 for not born again and don’t know.
On biblical views, proportions were very similar across samples with about ! to 1/3
believing the Bible is the actual word of God, to be taken literally (coded as 3); 2/3 indicated
the Bible is the inspired word of God and not everything should be taken literally (coded 2);
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and 5 to 11% of the participants said the Bible is an ancient book of fables, legends, etc.
recorded by men (coded 1).
[Table 1 about here]
Bivariate Associations. Table 2 displays the Pearson’s correlations between the Moral
Foundations, society works best factors and religious preferences for all three generations.
With the largest sample size, the student sample (Generation 3 or G3) demonstrated the
most significant relationships, though some of these are replicated in the first (G1) and
second (G2) generation samples, which will be described below. In the G3 sample, all of the
Moral Foundations are positively and significantly associated with each other, though the
relationships are stronger between Harm and Fairness and between Ingroup, Authority and
Purity. Generally, Ingroup, Authority and Purity are positively associated with conservative
positions on the SWB factors and the individualist religious measures, supporting
Hypothesis 2.1, though the relationships are not significant across the board. Supporting
Hypothesis 2.2, there is a negative relationship between Harm and Fairness and the three
society works best factors, indicating that those who score higher on these Moral
Foundations tend to have liberal views on organizing society politically, replicating previous
results between ideology and MF (Graham, Haidt and Nosek 2009; Koleva et al. 2012).
Harm and Fairness are also positively associated with communitarianism, indicating that
Christians who rely upon these foundations for moral decision-making are more likely to say
helping others is the way to be a better Christian. Harm and Fairness were also negatively
associated with views on the Bible, as higher scores on these foundations indicate less literal
views of the Bible. Fairness was negatively related to importance of religion in one’s life, but
neither it nor Harm was significantly associated with being born again. Regarding the direct
correlations between religious and political beliefs, conservative religious positions tend to
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be related to conservative political views in the SWB batteries and the Moral Foundations
associated with conservatives, and the importance of religion in guiding one’s daily life also
seems to serve as an additional “conservative” religious measure as it demonstrates the same
relationships with the political and moral variables.
In the parent and grandparent samples, also displayed in Table 2, all of the
relationships between the Moral Foundations replicate from the student sample, with general
increases in effect size with the age of the generation. For example, the correlation between
Fairness and Ingroup is r=.20 for G3, r=.44 for G2 and r=.70 for G1. The SWB index
performs similarly for Authority and Purity in G2 and Purity in G1, with higher scores on
these Foundations associated with more conservative views toward society. Harm, Fairness
and Ingroup, however, are not significantly related to SWB in G1 or G2, and the effect sizes
are so small, it’s unlikely a power problem. Regarding the communitarian measure, the
grandparent sample performs similarly to G3 with negative relationships between Authority
and Purity and SWB and a positive relationship with Fairness, supporting the hypotheses
that helping others is associated with Fairness and liberal views on society and avoiding sin is
more associated with reliance on Authority and Purity in making moral decisions. In the
parent sample, however, zero significant relationships emerge for communitarianism. When
breaking it down by gender, women in G2 demonstrate significant relationships between
communitarianism and the key variables but the men do not – so combining the two
obscures the pattern in a bivariate correlation. In Chapter 3, the measurement and modeling
will be split by gender to examine these differences. For the purposes of this chapter,
however, the group as a whole will be tested.
Views on the Bible had similar relationships with the other key variables as was
tested in G3, except for Harm in G1. Higher scores on harm are associated with more
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conservative views on the Bible, which is the opposite direction of the student sample.
Otherwise, conservative biblical views demonstrated somewhat stronger relationships in G1
and G2, as compared to G3, on items such as reliance on Ingroup, Authority and Purity and
conservative views on society. Importance of religion also demonstrated these relationships
with those same variables in all three generations.
Full Models
G3 Sample. To test the theory that Moral Foundations undergird both political and
religious beliefs and explain the intersection of these two belief frameworks, it is necessary to
create a measure that captures this overlap. As displayed in Table 3, a principal components
factor analysis on the individual SWB items and four religious measures in the student
sample revealed three factors. Most of the Society Works Best items and the communitarian
measure formed the first factor, which will be referred to as Group/Values as the SWB
items are mostly related to the role of the group and the individual and traditional/moral
values. Though communitarian demonstrated a lower loading than the other items at -.306,
this supports the hypothesis that one’s approach to religion – whether it is to avoid sin or
help others – is similar to one’s approach to values and the role of the group and individual
in society.
The second factor, labeled Individual Religiosity, is comprised of the traditional
religious measures: being born again, views on the Bible and the importance of religion in
one’s life. With the exception of the SWB 6 item, measuring one’s preferences for upholding
traditional values or changing values to fit current circumstances, these aspects of religion,
though significantly correlated with political items, seem to be capturing a different element
of an individual’s worldview. The SWB item measuring preferences for traditional values is
multi-vocal in that it had a factor loading around .44 for both the first and second factor.
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This multi-vocality is indicative in itself of the overlap between religious and political values.
Because principal-components factoring seeks to maximize the amount of variance within
individual items attributable to an underlying factor (and unrelated to other factors), items
demonstrating multi-vocality following the orthogonality-maximizing linear transformations
and rotations inherent in the factoring process are strong evidence of variance shared
between latent dimensions.7 For simplicity’s sake, this multi-vocal item was kept in the first
factor with the other SWB items in the indices created below. The third factor includes the
three items that loaded on the SWB Leader factor mentioned above and will be referred to
as Leadership.
Z scores were generated for each of the items in the factor analysis, and then indices
were created by adding together each of the items multiplied by their respective factor
loadings. These factors demonstrate that communitarianism seems to be the only religious
measure that is explained significantly by a latent trait representing political measures.
Additionally, it appears that preferences for traditional values is explained by both the
group/values and individual religiosity factors, which may be indicative of overlap between
political and religious preferences.
[Table 3 about here]
The factor analyses detailed above provide three dependent variables that capture the
overlap of political and religious preferences in G3. Providing a multivariate test of H2.1 and
H2.2, OLS regression models were performed on each of the factors outlined above, with
results displayed in Table 5. As hypothesized, all of the Moral Foundations were significantly
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Importantly, multi-vocality can manifest as the result of either variance explained by multiple latent
dimensions or simple measurement error, a characteristic of social traits that is indicated by the fact that none
of the individual items are completely uncorrelated with any of the factors (which, if present, would be
exhibited in a multitude of .000 factor loadings in the table below). That the SWB6 item loads on both the first
and second factors at the .44 level is indicative of a large amount of variance (20 percent) that is attributable to
two factors and unlikely to be the result of simple measurement error.
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associated, only Ingroup fell just below the traditional .05 level, with the Group/Values
factor in the expected directions, holding all other variables constant. In fact, the Moral
Foundations had higher standardized betas, on average, than the demographic variables of
gender, income and age. Specifically, Harm and Fairness were negatively associated with
Group/Values such that increases in these Moral Foundations for making moral judgments
resulted in liberal political views and an orientation toward helping others rather than
avoiding sin. Ingroup, Authority and Purity were positively associated with the
Group/Values factor, indicating that reliance on these foundations results in conservative
political views and more of a likelihood to avoid sin rather than help others.
[Table 4 about here]
Moral Foundations are less explanatory of the Individual Religiosity factor, as the R2
drops to .078 and only Authority and Purity are significantly associated with scores on the
factor. As individuals increase their scores on Authority and Purity, they are more likely to
say religion is an important guide in their lives, that the Bible is the literal word of God and
that they have had a born again experience, holding all other variables constant. The other
Moral Foundations are in the expected directions, even if they do not reach traditional levels
of significance, with Harm and Fairness negatively related to Individual Religiosity and
Ingroup positively related. These findings comport with Haidt and Graham’s morally
binding theory in that Authority, Purity and Ingroup concerns help to curb selfish desires
and possibly lead to a type of religiosity that emphasizes personal responsibility – as
evidenced in the individualist measures. The third model tells more of the same story, with
only Fairness and Authority significantly associated with the Leadership factor, but they and
the remaining Foundations demonstrate relationships in the expected direction. That is,
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Harm and Fairness are negatively related, or predict liberal attitudes on Leadership, and
Ingroup and Authority are positively related, or predict conservative attitudes.
G1 and G2 Samples. Because religious and political beliefs stabilize over one’s lifetime
and can differ by generation or cohort, separate principal components analyses were
conducted on the parent and grandparent samples and are displayed in Table 4. Each PCA
indicated a four-factor solution. For both G1 and G2 samples, the individual religiosity items
as well as the SWB item concerning values based on an external code loaded on the first
factor, which will be labeled Individual Religiosity. Five SWB items and the communitarian
measure loaded on the second factor in the parent sample. Six SWB items – some different
than in the parent sample – and the communitarian measure also loaded on the second
factor in the G1 sample, which will be labeled Group/Absolutes as the items relate either to
the role of the group and individual or to society working best in black-and-white versus
grey areas. Interestingly, communitarianism has a negative loading on this factor for the
grandparent sample, similar to the findings for the student sample, but has a positive loading
for the parent sample. The third factor contains three SWB items – though only one shared
item in both samples -- dealing with Ingroup/Outgroup dynamics, and the fourth factor
includes the remaining three SWB items dealing with Traditional Values. In sum, though
there is a discrepancy between a few items, all three generations demonstrated similar factor
structures in that the individualist religious measures reflect a nearly orthogonal factor from
the communitarian religious measure and most political items.
[Table 5 about here]
Though the factor structures and associated factor index variables differ for the
parent and grandparent samples, similar types of relationships emerge with the Moral
Foundations. In the parent sample, Moral Foundations and demographic variables were
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regressed on Individual Religiosity, Group/Absolutes, Ingroup/Outgroup and Traditional
Values. The Group/Absolutes model had a nonsignificant F, which makes the results unable
to be interpreted. The other three models were significant. Authority and Purity predict
higher levels of Individual Religiosity, indicating that desires for social order and avoidance
of contamination in making moral judgments is related to being born again, literal views of
the Bible and religion as an important guide in day–to-day living. This is consistent with
findings in the student sample, which may suggest possible transmission of these values. In
addition, Harm and Purity are predictive of scores on Traditional Values, with higher scores
on Harm resulting in lower scores on Traditional Values and higher scores on Purity
resulting in higher scores on Traditional Values. Harm was also negatively related to the
Ingroup/Outgroup factor, but Fairness almost reached traditional levels of significance in a
positive direction – indicating that higher scores on Fairness are associated with more
conservative views on Ingroup/Outgroup. In both of these models, the respective Moral
Foundations are the only significant predictors, even when accounting for demographic
variables.
For the grandparent sample, the Moral Foundations were regressed on the four
factors, but only the Group/Absolutes model was significant, most likely due to power
issues with the small sample size. Within this model, only Fairness and education were
significant predictors – though both had large standardized betas and the model
demonstrated the largest R2 of any of the generation models at .399. Fairness is negatively
related to Group/Absolutes, as a one-unit increase in using Fairness when making moral
judgments results in a decrease (ß=-.55, p < .01) of conservative views on the role of the
group and society working best with absolutes. Education also decreases conservative views
(ß=-.42, p < .05). As will be explored and discussed Chapter 3, part of the discrepancy in the
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models and relationships across generations may have more to do with measurement error
and differences onto which latent factors the Moral Foundation items load than the idea that
the findings in the student generation are unique to that sample, with limited external
validity.
Discussion
Supporting the hypotheses in this chapter, the findings in the student sample indicate that
the Moral Foundations predict political attitudes, with Harm and Fairness associated with
liberal views on organizing society and Ingroup, Authority and Purity with conservative. To
my knowledge, this is the first test of common religious measures and the Moral
Foundations battery, as previous applications only included content analyses of online
sermon content (Graham, Haidt and Nosek 2009) and written narratives of highly religious
and political individuals (McAdams et al. 2008). There is some evidence that some of these
relationships exist in the other generations, with most in the same direction as the larger
student sample. With small sample sizes, many of the models had low power and were
uninterpretable. At the very least, the religious and political measures demonstrate some
overlap in a principal components analysis, indicating there are some preferences that may
be expressed religiously and politically, and by replicating these relationships in multiple
generations, it’s possible the areas of this overlap may explain the transmission of political
and religious beliefs. What is less clear is whether Moral Foundations are the psychological
constructs explaining these relationships since there are differences between the generations.
A glimpse at the descriptive statistics for the means on each Foundation between
generations suggests these Foundations may not be similar across generations, which will be
explored in Chapter 3. This suggests that Moral Foundations may be as influenced as
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political and religious beliefs are by other dispositions, perhaps like personality or some
other sort of value structure.
The associations between Harm and Purity and the communitarian measure in the
student sample provide support for my argument that individuals rely upon different
foundations for binding moral communities, challenging Graham and Haidt’s (2010)
untested assertion that only Ingroup, Authority and Purity concerns are necessary for otherregarding behavior. For the religious individuals in my sample, those who believe “it is
wrong to hurt people; it is good to relieve suffering” (Harm/Care) (McAdams et al. 2008,
984) are more likely to say that being a better Christian means helping other people; whereas
those who believe “the body and certain aspects of life are sacred; cleanliness and health, as
well as their derivatives of chastity and piety, are all good” (Purity/Sanctity) (McAdams et al.
2008, 985) are more likely to select avoiding sin in trying to be more religious. As argued
earlier, regarding others is the way Harm/Care believers build community and act beyond
self-interest, and Purity/Sanctity believers perhaps think limiting autonomy through personal
responsibility for one’s actions is the answer to a well-functioning society. And these beliefs
seem to permeate both the political and religious realms. Authority and Purity seem to be the
most consistent predictive relationships, across all three samples and especially regarding
scores on the individualist religiosity measures, suggesting that perhaps the individualist
orientation is more likely to be shared within families or perhaps these measures have just
been vetted more over time and are more reliable than the fairly new communitarian and
SWB measures. Chapter 3 will explore whether Moral Foundations, religious preferences and
political preferences are shared within families, and if this is a possible explanation for the
source of the overlap between these belief systems.
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Student (G3)

Parent (G2)

Grandparent (G1)

Harm

M=4.30, SD=.79

M=4.35, SD=.81

M=4.71, SD=.73

Fairness

M=4.50, SD=.73

M=4.54, SD=.75

M=4.95, SD=.65

Ingroup

M=4.29, SD=.79

M=4.26, SD=.81

M=4.95, SD=.65

Authority

M=4.09, SD=.76

M=4.26, SD=.77

M=4.72, SD=.66

Purity
Society Works
Best

M=3.69, SD=.90

M=4.27, SD=.95

M=4.77, SD=.73

M=-1.67, SD=4.77

M=-1.12, SD=4.70

M=-1.12, SD=4.54

Communitarian

39% Avoid sin
58% Help others
3% Don’t know

42% Avoid sin
53% Help others
5% Don’t know

55% Avoid sin
41% Help others
4% Don’t know

Born Again

33% Yes
52% No
14% Don’t know

29% Yes
63% No
8% Don’t know

31% Yes
54% No
15% Don’t know

Bible Views

26% Actual word
67% Inspired word
7% Book of fables

30% Actual word
65% Inspired word
5% Book of fables

31% Actual word
58% Inspired word
11% Book of
fables

Importance of
Religion

12% Not important
29% Some guidance
28% Quite a bit
31% A great deal

5% Not important
17% Some guidance
28% Quite a bit
50% A great deal

2% Not important
14% Some
guidance
18% Quite a bit
66% A great deal

Age

M=19.48, SD=1.74

M=50.42 SD=6.05

M=73.25, SD=6.20

Income

Median=$80,001 to
$100,000

Median=$80,001 to
$100,000

Education

Median=Some college

Median=College graduate

Median=$60,001 to
$80,000
Median=Some
college

Sex

48% Male
52% Female

47% Male
53% Female

32% Male
68% Female

N (range)

451-583

137-225

64-94

Notes: Sample size is dependent on variable in question; all subsequent relationships use
casewise deletion.
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Table 2: Bivariate Correlations Between Moral Foundations, Political Preferences
and Religious Preferences for G1, G2 and G3 Sample

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1. Harm
2. Fairness

.60
.65
.61

3. Ingroup

.11
.45
.53

.20
.44
.70

4. Authority

.10
.26
.47

.18
.28
.36

.56
.55
.50

5. Purity

.21
.22
.31

.17
.21
.21

.41
.46
.33

.52
.66
.47

6. Society Works
Best

-.31
-.10
-.06

-.30
.02
-.12

.23
.13
-.03

.26
.34
.06

.18
.42
.47

7. Communitarian

.19
.15
.07

.10
.03
.24

.01
.04
-.01

-.10
.01
-.28

-.09
-.05
-.31

-.22
.01
-.28

8. Born Again

.02
-.10
.07

-.01
-.11
-.03

.09
.00
.06

.13
.15
.06

.08
.13
-.01

.02
.09
.11

.03
-.11
-.24

9. Bible Views

-.14
-.08
.28

-.08
-.10
.11

.09
.13
.37

.14
.28
.27

.11
.21
.33

.14
.24
.20

-.07
-.15
-.37

.33
.30
.27

10. Importance of Religion

-.03
.00
.08

-.10
.01
.06

.18
.15
.20

.30
.30
.29

.31
.37
.34

.17
.23
.04

-.09
-.11
-.20

.39
.37
.29

.45
.34
.55

Notes: All bolded correlations are significant at p < .05.
Correlations in the top row of each cell correspond to the student sample (G3), the second row the
parent sample (G2) and the third row the grandparent sample (G1).
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Table 3: Principal Components Factor Analysis on G3 Society Works Best and
Religiosity Items
Group/Values

Individual
Religiosity

Leadership

SWB1

.309

-.007

-.479

SWB2

.006

.019

.72

SWB3

.507

.085

.319

SWB4

.627

-.20

-.111

SWB5

.267

.172

-.062

SWB6

.447

.437

.158

SWB7

.65

-.076

-.084

SWB8

.243

.069

.492

SWB9

.512

-.094

.135

SWB10

.358

.049

.134

SWB11

.358

.049

.134

SWB12

.455

-.064

-.267

Importance of
Religion

-.053

.779

.105

Born Again

-.09

.718

-.184

Bible Views

.05

.681

.101

-.306

-.107

-.127

Communitarian

Note: Results are reported after a varimax rotation was performed.
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Table 4: Political and Religious Factors Regressed on Moral Foundations in G3
Individual
Religiosity

Group/Values

Leadership

Coeff. (S.E.)

ß

Coeff. (S.E.)

ß

Coeff.
(S.E.)

ß

Harm

-.833***
(.163)

-.275

-.133
(.114)

-.066

-.10
(.072)

-.072

Fairness

-.648***
(.18)

-.199

-.25†
(.13)

-.113

-.221**
(.077)

-.148

Ingroup

.298†
(.161)

.092

.041
(.114)

.019

.108
(.07)

.078

Authority

.686***
(.176)

.206

.393**
(.123)

.177

.168*
(.076)

.117

Purity

.311*
(.137)

.11

.245*
(.096)

.13

-.01
(.06)

-.009

Female

-.417*
(.209)

-.088

.26†
(.15)

.082

.153
(.095)

.07

Income

.034
(.061)

.024

-.029
(.042)

-.031

-.071**
(.026)

-.109

Age

-.003
(.062)

-.002

-.052
(.046)

-.051

-.015
(.026)

-.023

Constant

1.816
(1.61)

-.14
(1.157)

.691
(.691)

R2

.253

.078

.063

N

451

500

583

Notes: Two-tailed tests where ***<.001, **<.01, *<.05, and †<.10. Standard errors are in
parentheses.
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Table 5: Principal Components Factor Analysis on G1 and G2 Society Works Best
and Religiosity Items
Individual
Religiosity

Group/Absolutes

Ingroup/Outgroup

Traditional
Values

SWB1

.006
-.095

-.014
.029

.708
.792

-.10
-.29

SWB2

.086
-.054

.502
.011

.307
-.065

-.055
.743

SWB3

-.179
.143

.153
.62

.255
.138

.482
.146

SWB4

-.048
-.003

.579
.079

.113
.797

.035
.241

SWB5

.259
.177

-.037
.45

.506
-.124

.249
-.414

SWB6

.268
.177

.061
.167

-.074
.399

.824
.479

SWB7

-.099
.342

.607
.57

-.095
.413

.208
.061

SWB8

.286
.079

.512
.562

.167
.356

.181
-.038

SWB9

-.398
-.132

-.088
.508

.272
-.026

.565
.124

SWB10

-.057
-.271

.365
.541

.447
-.321

.071
-.152

SWB11

.478
.455

.273
.27

-.134
.277

.39
.322

SWB12

-.025
.224

.377
.063

-.267
.323

.196
.285

Importance of
Religion

.782
.88

-.045
-.049

.047
-.129

.077
.078

Born Again

.658
.615

-.159
-.174

.047
.34

.083
-.33

Bible Views

.527
.754

.174
.182

.412
-.06

.08
.007

-.134
.523
-.41
-.214
-.32
-.514
.012
.014
Note: Results are reported after a varimax rotation was performed. G1 factor loadings are displayed
in italics; G2 in normal font.
Communitarian
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Table 6: Political and Religious Factors Regressed on Moral Foundations in G2
Individual
Religiosity
Coeff.
ß
(S.E.)

Group/
Absolutes
Coeff.
ß
(S.E.)

Harm

-.284
(.215)

-.14

Nonsignificant F

Fairness

-.339†
(.202)

Ingroup

Ingroup/Outgroup

Traditional
Values
Coeff.
ß
(S.E.)

Coeff. (S.E.)

ß

-.424**
(.14)

-.30

-.343*
(.169)

-.21

-.16

.253†
(.146)

.17

.134
(.169)

.08

-.149
(.205)

-.07

.168
(.14)

.12

-.14
(.163)

-.09

Authority

.60*
(.238)

.25

.258
(.159)

.17

.058
(.185)

.03

Purity

.42*
(.176)

.22

.077
(.126)

.06

.479**
(.145)

.34

Female

.374
(.255)

.12

-.079
(.172)

-.03

-.194
(.202)

-.08

Income

-.092
(.092)

-.08

-.011
(.062)

-.01

-.011
(.07)

-.01

Age

-.001
(.021)

-.004

-.018
(.014)

-.10

.004
(.016)

.02

Education

-.003
(.068)

-.003

-.053
(.047)

-.09

-.042
(.054)

-.06

Constant

-.938
(1.575)

R2

.188

N

160

-.073
(1.055)

131

-.395
(1.217)

.136

.142

174

172

Notes: Two-tailed tests where ***<.001, **<.01, *<.05, and †<.10. Standard errors are in
parentheses.
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Table 7: Political and Religious Factors Regressed on Moral Foundations in G1
Individual
Religiosity
Coeff.
ß
(S.E.)

Group/Absolutes
Coeff. (S.E.)

ß

-.278
(.672)

-.09

Fairness

-2.159**
(.784)

-.55

Ingroup

.541
(.849)

.14

Authority

-.362
(.735)

-.10

Purity

.088
(.678)

.03

Female

-.996
(.701)

-.22

Income

.068
(.216)

.05

Age

.046
(.071)

.12

Education

-.376*
(.168)

-.42

Constant

10.996
(5.21)

Harm

Nonsignificant F

R2
N

Ingroup/
Outgroup
Coeff.
ß
(S.E.)

Traditional
Values
Coeff.
ß
(S.E.)

Nonsignificant F

Nonsignificant F

63

68

.399
59

41

Notes: Two-tailed tests where ***<.001, **<.01, *<.05, and †<.10. Standard errors are in
parentheses.
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Chapter 3: Are Moral Foundations, Religiosity and Political
Attitudes Transmitted across Generations?
Chapter 2 suggests that there is an underlying set of principles that explain the overlap
between religious and political beliefs. Because previous findings indicate some of these
beliefs are transmitted from parents to children, and Moral Foundations might explain the
overlap of these types of beliefs, is it the case that Moral Foundations also run in families?
Or is it possible that Moral Foundations are developed elsewhere and may explain how
individuals connect the political and religious but do not necessarily explain these shared
frameworks across generations?
Most of the socialization literature focuses on partisanship, political interest and
participation or attitudes on issues of the day (Jennings and Niemi 1974; Jennings, Stoker
and Bowers 2009; Tedin 1974; Thomas 1971). Parent-child agreement tends to be higher for
“attitudes with a strong affective or moral component,” such as abortion or views on school
prayer (Jennings et al. 2009), and the strength of parental socialization depends upon the
importance of an issue to the parent and how correctly a child identifies a parent’s position
(Tedin 1974; Thomas 1971). Because socialization is “low-key and haphazard” (Jennings and
Niemi 1974, 330), it may be more likely that general values or “broad orientations” (PearsonMerkowitz and Gimpel 2009, 166), like Moral Foundations, are more successfully
transmitted and then possibly result in similar religious and political beliefs.
Nearly all of the political and religious socialization studies involve parent-child dyads,
but this dissertation extends the unit analysis to include grandparents. The logic behind
adding a third generation is to determine whether a “multiplier effect” exists, in that when
paternal and maternal grandparents agree on political and religious preferences, mothers and
fathers will agree and then be more likely to act as “middlepersons” in relaying these values
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to the third generation (Jennings and Niemi 1974, 156; Beck and Jennings 1975).
Unfortunately, because of the limitations of my data collection, I was unable to properly
model these relationships on both sides of the family with mothers and fathers and their
respective parents, as there are only eight families where there is data for G3, G2 mothers
and fathers and G1 maternal and paternal grandparents. As such, the following hypotheses
will reflect a proxy to these relationships by examining the association between the third
generation, each parent and each set of grandparents. Thus, the relationships will be
examined in aggregate across the sample because I am unable to model full family
relationships. If there are positive associations between the generations’ preferences,
however, this may suggest a multiplier effect could be occurring in that parents (G2) enter
marriage with shared preferences from their parents (G1), and then agreement with their
spouse may increase the likelihood of agreement with their children (G3). But without
modeling each family unit across generations on both sides of the family, a true test of the
multiplier effect is not possible.
In addition, recent studies have suggested that children are more likely to share political
preferences with their mothers because they tend to spend more time with them
(Zuckerman et al. 2007); yet earlier studies indicated that fathers were the purveyors of these
political orientations (Beck and Jennings 1975). Regarding transmission of religiosity, there
are not clear, consistent findings on whether mothers or fathers are more dominant
(Dollahite and Thatcher 2008), but much like the multiplier effect in shared partisanship,
both parents together seem to exert more influence than one or the other (Kierun and
Monroe 1987). Because there are not consistent theoretical findings on such gender effects
and the majority of the measures in this dissertation have not been examined across
generations, the hypotheses will not reflect directionality or strength of relationship based
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upon parental gender and/or side of the family. That is, I do not hypothesize that fathers
will exert more influence on their children than mothers or paternal grandparents more than
maternal grandparents, but the statistical tests of the hypotheses will be divided by sides of
the family to try to approximate the “multiplier effect” of intergenerational agreement and
explore possible maternal/paternal differences. Finally, the only three-generation study of
political preferences (Beck and Jennings 1975) indicated that generations nearest one another
(Generation 1 and Generation 2, Generation 2 and Generation 3) are more likely to agree
than those furthest apart (Generation 1 and Generation 3) because of the significant
difference in level of contact. The following hypotheses will be tested to explore the
relationships described above:
Hypothesis 3.1: There will be a positive association between the political preferences
of G1, G2 and G3, with the generations closest together demonstrating stronger
associations.
Hypothesis 3.2: There will be a positive association between the religious preferences
of G1, G2 and G3, with the generations closest together demonstrating stronger
associations.
Hypothesis 3.3: There will be a positive association between the Moral Foundations of
G1, G2 and G3, with the generations closest together demonstrating stronger associations.
Methods
The data files from Chapter 2 were combined into one dataset where one row
represents a family unit, including the variables for students, the mother and/or father and
the maternal and/or paternal grandparents. To examine the transmission of Moral
Foundations and political and religious beliefs across generations, separate models will be
created for maternal and paternal relatives. Regarding the grandparent measures, the score
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from one grandparent will be used if the other one is not present, and their scores will be
averaged if they are both present (Amato and Cheadle 2005). For example, if a maternal
grandmother answered the survey but the maternal grandfather did not, her score on Harm
will be used in the models. In the matched family sample, there are 100 biological mothers,
117 biological fathers, two adoptive mothers, eight stepparents, 43 maternal grandmothers,
20 maternal grandfathers, 26 paternal grandmothers, and 13 paternal grandfathers. For the
purposes of the following analyses, only biological relatives were included. Though Chapter
2 explored the overlap in political and religious beliefs by factoring these measures into
latent factors, predicted by Moral Foundations, the current chapter will examine the
relationships of the measures individually across generations because of the difference in
factor structures between each generation.
Hypothesis 3.1: There will be a positive association between the political preferences of G1, G2 and
G3, with the generations closest together demonstrating stronger associations.
Though the current study is not concerned with partisanship, it is the most consistent
finding in the socialization literature, so it may be helpful to see if the sample and data I have
collected – though not representative of the American citizenry -- can replicate previous
findings. That is, demonstrating that G1, G2 and G3 share party identification adds some
confidence that this sample is not unique. Furthermore, if “broad orientations” are more
likely to be transmitted across generations than issues of the day, comparing the society
works best battery to party identification gives some indication of whether the battery is
capturing these orientations or if it is merely performing like specific issue attitudes that are
more subject to generational effects.
Correlations of party identification and the political measure central to this dissertation,
the society works best battery, are displayed in Table 1. The party measure asked individuals
to place themselves on a nine-point scale (1-strong Democrat, 2-not strong Democrat, 3!
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Independent, near Democrat, 4-Independent, 5-Independent, near Republican, 6-not strong
Republican, 7-strong Republican, 8-other party, 9-don’t know). Individuals selecting 8 or 9
were dropped, and the remaining were recoded 1-3 = 1 for Democrat, 4 = 2 for
Independent, and 5-7 = 3 for Republican. As expected, there is strong correlation between
the party identification of the student sample and both of their parents (mothers r=.62,
p=.00; fathers r=.44, p=.00), with a stronger effect size for mothers – replicating earlier
findings (Zuckerman et al. 2007; Jennings and Niemi 1974). These relationships were not as
strong between G1 and G2, but this is most likely due to the small sample size. Interestingly,
fathers in G2 have a stronger positive relationship with their in-laws’ party identification
(r=.37, p =.03) than with their own parents (r=.10, p=.71). But again, with sample sizes
between 17 and 33, these findings should be interpreted with caution.
[Table 1 about here]
Regarding the society works best battery, there are significant, positive associations
between G3 and mothers (r=.32, p<.05) and fathers (r=.22, p<.05) in G2. The relationships
between G1 and the other generations are mixed, with negative associations between G2
mothers’ party ID and her G1 parents’ SWB (r=-.57, p<.05) and a nonsignificant but also
negative association between both generations’ SWB scores. Yet, the relationship between
maternal grandparents and G3 is positive, though nonsignificant, just as the political
preferences of G2 fathers and their G1 parents are nonsignificant but in the positive
direction – indicating there might be an intergenerational multiplier effect occurring. Many
of these effect sizes are small to medium so the nonsignificance is most likely a power
problem. Other than the negative relationships between G2 mothers and their parents, the
remaining correlations support Hypothesis 3.1 in that political preferences, as defined by the
broad orientations toward organizing society, are transmitted within families. Some of the
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relationships between individuals’ SWB scores and their family members’ party identification
are stronger than between the SWB scores themselves – which may suggest that the SWB
battery is capturing different dimensions between the generations. The latter is supported by
the fact that the factor structures with SWB and the religiosity items found in Chapter 2
differ between samples. [Table 1 about here]
Hypothesis 3.2: There will be a positive association between the religious preferences of G1, G2 and
G3, with the generations closest together demonstrating stronger associations.
Tables 2 and 3 display the bivariate relationships of religious preferences between
maternal and paternal family members and the student sample. The most consistent
relationships occur between importance of religion of one generation and various other
measures in the other generations; suggesting that relying on religion to guide one’s daily
decisions may be guided by the multiplier effect in that there is a fairly steady relationship
across generations. For example, the more important religion is to a mother or father in G2,
the more important it is to her or his child in G3, and importance of religion in the maternal
and paternal G1 sample demonstrates medium effect sizes and some significant relationships
with religious measures in G2 and G3. Though there is no relationship between G2 and G3
regarding being born again in the maternal family sample, there is a strong significant
relationship on this measure between G1 and G2 (r=.63, p<.05). In the paternal family
sample, there are no cases that match on being born again for G1 and G2, but there is
significant relationship, with a large effect size, between G1 and G3 (r=.77, p<.05).
Regarding views on the Bible, there are strong, significant relationships between fathers in
G2 and children in G3 but not between G1 and either generation. The association in the
maternal family sample is only between G1 and G3.
[Tables 2 and 3 about here]
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There is no significant relationship between a student and his or her mother or father’s

communitarianism (r=-.05, p>.05; r=.12, p>.05). Because some previous literature has
indicated that there is a gender difference in a child’s reception of parental religious influence
(Kierun and Munro 1987), I split the student sample by gender, and another pattern
emerged. Sons and mothers have a positive relationship (r=.39, p =.056), in that they are
likely to agree on whether avoiding sin or helping others is the best way to be a Christian.
Daughters, on the other hand, demonstrate a negative relationship with their mothers on
communitarianism (r=-.36, p = .038). In this sense, G2 mothers may be acting as
middlepersons between G1 parents and G3 sons regarding viewing on how to be a good
Christian. Splitting by gender of G3 does not reveal any significant relationships between
fathers and sons or daughters.
There is a positive association between the mother being born again and her son’s views
on the Bible, such that being born again results in the son being more likely to believe the
Bible is the actual word of God (r=.41, p =.023). This same strong relationship emerges
between fathers and sons (r=.49, p=.001) and to a lesser extent, fathers and daughters
(r=.25, p=.08). This relationship is not significant for mothers and daughters, and, in fact,
the correlation is in the opposite direction (r=-.13, p = .439). There is, however, a positive
relationship between views on the Bible for mothers and daughters (r=.34, p =.031), fathers
and sons (r=.42, p=.001) and fathers and daughters (r=.30, p=.033). Regarding religious
importance, fathers and daughters are significantly associated, but there is no relationship for
fathers and sons.
Kierun and Munro (1987) found that fathers exhibit more influence than mothers on
daughters’ religious behavior (mostly church involvement), whereas both parents are
influential to sons. Because women tend to be more religious already, fathers are thought to

!

!

XS!

exhibit more influence because if they are attending church more, it signals to the rest of the
family that this is an important behavior (Kierun and Munro 1987). This pattern of
association can be found in some of the religious measures here, but the current sample
involves a slightly older child generation at a different time period than the Kierun and
Munro study (adolescents in the home ages 13 to 18 in 1983 and college-age youth in 2011),
and the measure of concern is religious belief – not behavior – which could have different
sources of influence. In sum, the statistical relationships in this data do not tell a uniform
story as to the shared religiosity between sons, daughters, fathers and mothers, which is quite
possibly due to the third generation being at an age where religious beliefs are in flux.
Unfortunately, the sample sizes between G1 and G2 are generally too small to draw any
major conclusions.
Hypothesis 3.3: There will be a positive association between the Moral Foundations of G1, G2 and
G3, with the generations closest together demonstrating stronger associations.
Table 4 displays the bivariate relationships of Moral Foundations between the student,
his or her mother and his or her maternal grandparents. Table 5 displays these same
correlations for the paternal side. There are significant, positive relationships between Harm,
Fairness, Authority and Purity in G2 and G3 in the maternal family sample, but only
Ingroup and Authority reach traditional significance levels between G2 and G3 on the
paternal side. Ingroup views are the only shared relationship on one Moral Foundation
between G1 and G3. On the paternal side, G1 Purity is positively associated with G3 Purity,
but the Ingroup scores are negatively associated between the two generations. More
relationships emerge between the five Moral Foundations across generations than within
them. For example, Fairness in G1 is significantly related to Ingroup views in G3.
Regarding the relationships between G1 and G2, no significant relationships emerge on
the maternal side, but with small effect sizes (r=-.17 to .23), there is most likely a power
!
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problem with the small sample. Furthermore, the relationships are not even all in the
expected direction, as Harm, Fairness and Ingroup are negatively signed. Similar puzzling
results occur in the paternal G1-G2 correlations, as the nonsignificant relationships
demonstrate decent effect sizes (r=.08 to -.39), but in positive and negative directions. When
the G3 sample is split by gender, the relationships between mothers in G2 and children in
G3 shift a little bit but stay in the same general direction, with sons demonstrating stronger
relationships than daughters with their mothers. No relationships, apart from a nearly
significant association in Ingroup attitudes between fathers and sons, emerge on the paternal
side when splitting G3 by gender.
[Tables 4 and 5 about here]
Because the relationships do not form a coherent pattern, it is difficult to speculate
about any sort of multiplier effect or parents acting as middlepersons, relaying values
between generations. Examining the correlations between mothers and fathers in G2 may be
part of the answer: the only Moral Foundation association that achieves traditional levels of
statistical significance is Purity (r=.24, p<.05). Harm, Fairness and Ingroup display positive
relationships between parents at the .10 level, but all demonstrate low effect sizes (right
around .2). This supports earlier literature that the most successful transmission occurs
between attitudes that are shared by both parents (Jennings and Niemi 1974). That is,
Hypothesis 3.3 is partially supported in that some Moral Foundations are passed down in
families, but this may be moderated by parental agreement.
One possibility for the sporadic relationships could be due to differences in means
across the generations. Two-sample, unpaired t tests were performed on the Moral
Foundation measures between generations, displayed in Table 6. There were significant
mean differences between scores on nearly all of the Moral Foundations between G3 and
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both sets of grandparents and between G1 and G2, with higher scores corresponding with
age of the generation. That is, the grandparents rated nearly every Moral Foundation higher
than G2 and G3, regarding its relevance in making moral decisions. Parents and children in
G2 and G3 demonstrated more similar scores on the Foundations, with Authority and Purity
both demonstrating higher means for mothers and fathers as compared to their children.
This suggests that perhaps concerns for Authority and Purity increase with one’s age or may
be a remnant of period effects. Without longitudinal data, it is impossible to determine
whether the current student generation will maintain their current levels of Moral
Foundation scores or if they will develop intuitions similar to the older generations as they
reach that point in their life course.
[Table 6 about here]
Discussion
In sum, there are stronger relationships between the generations closest to one another
(G1-G2 and G2-G3) than between generations one and three, which is consistent with
previous three-generation findings on political items (Beck and Jennings 1975). It is possible
that some of the relationships are mediated by demographic variables, such as income and
education, or relational variables measuring level of contact between the generations. With
the limitations of the small sample size due to incomplete three-generation triads, it is
difficult to model these added parameters without jeopardizing already precious degrees of
freedom. In addition, the G3 population is nearly identical on individual-level socioeconomic status so should the model include the education and income of the parents or the
grandparents? There is a dearth of theory as to whether demographic variables mediate or
moderate transmission of political or religious attitudes across three generations. Measures
such as interest in politics between the parent and grandparent generation may be the next
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place to look for these effects, but is beyond the scope here as the current study is more
concerned with underlying, general preferences and not necessarily politically charged items
like partisanship or issues of the day.
With n’s ranging from 14 to 103 in the between-generation correlations, it is also
difficult to determine whether these associations, or lack thereof, are due to actual
differences in the participants and samples or due to statistical problems that plague small
samples, such as measurement error. As mentioned in the last section, it is also possible that
the Moral Foundations item battery is not capturing the same sorts of dimensions within
each generation. To test this, a principal components factor analysis was performed on the
20 items in the Moral Foundations for each generation. Examination of Eigen values over 1
and scree plots revealed six-factor solutions for each generation, but a five-factor solution
was imposed on the data to replicate the five Moral Foundations. Results are displayed in
Table 7, with G3 in the top row, G2 in the middle row and G1 in the bottom row. Overall,
the Harm and Fairness items are loading together on the first factor and Ingroup and
Authority items on the second factor, but the rest of the items are scattered throughout
those and the remaining three factors in no particular pattern. It is possible, then, that the
way in which participants answered the individual questions corresponding with each Moral
Foundation introduced more measurement error because their collective answers do not
load on the latent factors pre-determined by Haidt and Graham’s coding scheme. There is
some evidence in Chapter 2 that Moral Foundations exhibit relationships with religious and
political preferences, but these relationships may not carry across generations or even explain
the covariance of the belief sets in the same way. Contrary to the conceptual model
developed earlier in this dissertation, Moral Foundations do not seem to persist across
generations and therefore may not explain the overlap of political and religious beliefs, as it
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relates to socialization within families. It is uncertain why these Foundations are functioning
differently across age groups and what this means for the stability of this construct within
individuals. If the Foundations shift with age or shift by cohort, but many of the religious
and political measures in this study are partially shared across generations, the Foundations
are either problematic from a measurement perspective or reflect a disposition apart from
the political and the religious – at least when regarding intergenerational transmission.
[Table 7 about here]
What the findings suggest is that regarding religiosity, there are more consistent
relationships with the individualist items as compared to the communitarian measure
between generations. This supports the literature that suggests a “highly literal”
understanding of doctrine is more likely to result in “more accurate transmission to
adolescents than mixtures of literal and symbolic beliefs” (Clark, Worthington, and Danser
1988, 464; Smith et al. 1998; Cornwall 1989; Clark and Worthington 1987). !It is also
possible the communitarian variable is plagued with measurement issues as it is a fairly new
construct (first used in the 2006 and 2008 ANES) that only offers a forced choice resulting
in a dichotomous outcome. The strong findings on party identification between generations
suggests the current sample is following the patterns of the Jennings and Niemi rolling
sample of generations – the major and one of the only intergenerational datasets used in
political science. Though shared parent-child attitudes on issues of the day are often scarce
in socialization studies, some of the inconsistent relationships on the broad principles of the
society works best battery are puzzling, but also may be due to measurement in that the
individual items load differently in each generation sample. It is also likely that the most
successful transmission occurs at the tails – that is, within the most liberal, most
conservative, most individualist or most communitarian families. Without an adequate
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sample to drop out the middle or at least split the sample by the extremes, this is nearly
impossible to test with the current data.
This is the first ever examination of all three frameworks across three generations,
and even with challenges of measurement error and sample size, this analysis demonstrates
that some aspects of political, religious and moral intuition belief sets are transmitted within
families. The higher agreement between adjacent generations also hints at the possibility of
both sides of the family in G1 and G2 spouses may serve as multipliers in the passage of
these values to children in G3. Earlier, this dissertation argued that an underlying
psychological construct might explain the covariance and persistence of political and
religious preferences, yet this current chapter suggests that Moral Foundations may not be
the best measurement tool for this construct. Moral Foundations are correlated within
generations and with the religious and political measures within individuals in these
generations, but this theoretical framework does not seem to persist across generations – at
least according to this analysis. In other words, Moral Foundations could explain part of the
covariance between religious and political preferences within individuals, but it may not
explain the source of the covariance – or why these belief sets tend to be relayed within
families. To further explore the sources of a latent trait underlying the political and the
religious, the next chapter will examine how genetic and environmental influences may
explain this relationship.
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Table 1: Bivariate Correlations of SWB and Party ID between G3, G1 and G2
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

G3
1. SWB
2. Party

.39

G2 - Mother
3. SWB

.32

.32

4. Party

.19

.62

.38

5. SWB

.22

.44

.35

.11

6. Party

.29

.44

.35

.58

.21

7. SWB

.27

.02

-.27

-.57

.29

-.22

8. Party

.33

.07

.27

.24

.17

.37

.19

9. SWB

.08

.45

.42

.61

.46

.35

.

1.00

10. Party

.21

.22

.34

.25

.27

.10

.

.31

G2 – Father

G1 - Maternal

G1 - Paternal

.20

Notes: All bolded correlations are significant at p < .05; italics are p < .10. N for G3-G2
relationships ranges from 79 to 105, G2-G1 ranges from 9 to 25 and G3-G1 ranges from 20 to 39.
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Table 2: Bivariate correlations of Religiosity between G3 and maternal G1 and G2
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

G3
1. Communitarian
2. Born Again

.03

3. Bible

-.07

.33

4. Importance of
Religion

-.09

.39

.40

5. Communitarian

-.05

-.13

-.04

-.20

6. Born Again

.13

.09

.15

.12

-.30

7. Bible

-.13

.15

.10

.23

-.23

.42

8. Importance of
Religion

.13

.12

.14

.25

-.27

.40

.29

9. Communitarian

-.13

.17

-.17

-.08

-.21

-.34

-.13

.02

10. Born Again

.13

-.15

-.05

.00

-.04

.63

.07

.14

-.38

11. Bible

.11

.15

.33

.28

-.05

.33

.20

.12

-.54

.44

12. Importance of
Religion

-.02

.13

.25

.11

-.34

.29

.39

.34

-.32

.51

G2

G1

.57

Notes: All bolded correlations are significant at p < .05; italics are p < .10. N for G3-G2
relationships ranges from 58 to 74, G2-G1 ranges from 4 to 15 and G3-G1 ranges from 21 to 39.

!

!

YT!

Table 3: Bivariate correlations of Religiosity between G3 and paternal G1 and G2
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

G3
1. Communitarian
2. Born Again

.03

3. Bible

-.07

.33

4. Importance of
Religion

-.09

.39

.40

5. Communitarian

.12

-.16

.22

-.31

6. Born Again

-.08

.11

.14

.15

.07

7. Bible

-.06

.36

.36

.25

-.15

.25

8. Importance of
Religion

.01

-.03

.20

.24

.07

.35

.41

9. Communitarian

.37

-.54

-.46

-.72

.

.

-.64

-.68

10. Born Again

-.05

.77

.23

.67

-1.0

.

.55

.20

-.34

11. Bible

-.20

.45

.00

.21

-.38

.33

.04

.00

-.02

.19

12. Importance of
Religion

-.19

.49

.14

.06

-.06

.29

.19

.15

.24

.23

G2

G1

.63

Notes: All bolded correlations are significant at p < .05; italics are p < .10. N for G3-G2
relationships ranges from 70 to 104, G2-G1 ranges from 3 to 13 and G3-G1 ranges from 11 to 27.
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Table 4: Bivariate correlations of Moral Foundations between G3 and maternal G1
and G2
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

G3
1. Harm
2. Fairness

.60

3. Ingroup
4.
Authority
5. Purity

.11

.20

.10

.18

.56

.21

.17

.41

.52

6. Harm

.37

.13

-.18

-.01

.15

7. Fairness

.21

.19

-.09

.09

.06

.58

8. Ingroup
9.
Authority
10. Purity

.13

.00

.08

.19

.25

.50

.40

.06

.05

.27

.31

.29

.24

.19

.51

.01

-.06

.11

.33

.37

.19

.13

.42

.62

.19

-.06

.17

.09

.24

-.17

-.09

-.17

-.04

-.16

.00

-.11

.43

.34

.15

-.16

-.09

-.11

.08

-.29

.64

-.02

.12

.48

.28

.07

-.18

.08

-.19

.17

-.35

.56

.78

-.16

.10

.08

.09

.12

.14

.11

.33

.24

.41

.19

.15

G2

G1
11. Harm
12.
Fairness
13.
Ingroup
14.
Authority

.35

-.03 .11 .14 .09 -.26 -.09 .21 .29 .23 .24 .02 .32 .63
.36
Notes: All bolded correlations are significant at p < .05; italics are p < .10. N for G3-G2
relationships ranges from 88 to 91, G2-G1 ranges from 19 to 23 and G3-G1 ranges from 34 to 38.
15. Purity
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Table 5: Bivariate correlations of Moral Foundations between G3 and paternal G1
and G2
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

G3
1. Harm
2.
Fairness
3.
Ingroup
4.
Authority
5. Purity

.60
.11

.20

.10

.18

.56

.21

.17

.41

.52

.06

-.01

-.01

-.10

-.06

.06

.07

-.02

-.08

-.03

.72

-.07

.01

.22

.18

.13

.41

.47

-.09

-.08

.21

.16

.07

.33

.36

.56

-.05

-.14

.06

.12

.18

.27

.28

.47

.66

-.10

-.14

-.01

.01

-.03

.37

.26

.01

-.12

-.09

.17

.20

-.24

-.04

.02

.17

.08

-.37

-.52

-.58

.64

.04

.19

-.13

.26

.19

.19

.31

-.39

-.38

-.41

.54

.75

-.11

-.27

.00

.21

.20

.04

.20

-.05

-.28

-.04

.69

.54

.62

.06

-.19

.17

.47

.61

-.07

-.13

-.21

-.44

-.17

.33

.39

.39

G2
6. Harm
7.
Fairness
8.
Ingroup
9.
Authority
10. Purity
G1
11. Harm
12.
Fairness
13.
Ingroup
14.
Authority
15. Purity

.52

Notes: All bolded correlations are significant at p < .05; italics are p < .10. N for G3-G2
relationships ranges from 99 to 103, G2-G1 ranges from 14 to 16 and G3-G1 ranges from 25 to 26.
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Table 6: Two-sample T Tests of Moral Foundations between G1, G2 and G3
Significant
Mean
Difference

!

No Mean
Difference

G1: Maternal
G2: Mother

Harm
Fairness
Ingroup
Authority
Purity

G2: Mother
G3: Student

Authority
Purity

Harm
Fairness
Ingroup

G1: Maternal
G3: Student

Harm
Ingroup
Authority
Purity

Fairness

G1: Paternal
G2: Father

Fairness
Ingroup
Authority
Purity

G2: Father
G3: Student

Harm
Purity

Authority
Fairness
Ingroup

G1: Paternal
G3: Student

Harm
Ingroup
Authority
Purity

Fairness

Harm
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Table 7: Principal Components Factor Analysis of Moral Foundations for Three
Generations
1

2

3

4

5

.70
.72
.44

-.08
.03
-.02

-.02
-.12
.05

.14
.12
.72

.08
.04
-.09

.71
.72
.69

-.01
.13
-.18

-.09
-.07
.04

-.03
.09
.42

.25
-.23
.04

Lovecountry
(Ingroup)

.15
.39
.60

.48
.59
.44

.43
.21
.15

.03
.29
.38

-.09
-.07
-.21

Respect
(Authority)

.35
.30
.67

.70
.64
.01

.11
.35
-.01

.15
.10
.16

-.06
-.09
.41

Decency
(Purity)

.40
.17
.56

.25
.56
-.07

.30
.29
.18

.39
-.22
.27

-.22
.23
.34

Weak
(Harm)

.70
.74
.54

.11
.18
.23

.07
.00
.16

.06
.06
.30

-.01
.08
-.14

Unfairly
(Fairness)

.65
.71
.84

.33
.33
.16

-.14
.13
.02

.01
-.02
.04

.20
-.13
-.09

Betray
(Ingroup)

.46
.41
.84

.49
.62
.05

.27
.00
.06

-.02
.06
-.01

-.01
-.07
.04

Traditions
(Authority)

.28
.07
.09

.15
.72
.22

.32
-.06
.13

.31
.17
.73

-.10
.19
.17

Disgusting
(Purity)

.22
.43
.04

.09
.47
.14

-.07
.09
.08

.72
-.01
-.05

.02
.25
.72

Compassion
(Harm)

.49
.49
.41

-.15
-.20
.27

.10
.49
.25

.19
.33
.41

.37
.18
-.32

Fairly
(Fairness)

.25
.13
.36

.12
.03
.20

-.10
.24
.47

-.17
.64
-.21

.65
-.18
-.45

Emotionally
(Harm)
Treated
(Fairness)
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History
(Ingroup)

-.26
-.15
.28

.60
.29
.18

.31
.69
.46

.13
.02
-.27

.08
.14
-.27

Kidrespect
(Authority)

-.04
-.03
.14

.68
.13
.35

.01
.80
.31

.27
-.05
.03

.11
.21
.34

Harmlessdg
(Purity)

-.06
-.15
.06

.20
.59
.57

.15
.26
.02

.73
-.04
.00

.16
.28
.56

Animal
(Harm)

.15
.10
-.31

-.25
.14
.16

.07
-.05
.61

.11
.80
.34

.65
.02
-.14

Justice
(Fairness)

.06
.16
.13

.26
.07
.03

.00
.61
.78

.33
.44
.14

.63
-.11
.08

Family
(Ingroup)

.04
-.03
.11

.11
.03
.03

.63
.08
.64

-.16
.56
.05

.33
.32
.21

Sexroles
(Authority)

-.08
-.02
.04

.11
-.02
.75

.66
.11
.11

.04
-.02
.14

-.18
.82
-.07

Unnatural
(Purity)

-.08
-.08
.07

.15
.28
.84

.62
.18
.05

.43
.02
.03

-.03
.71
.12

Notes: Factor loadings in the top row of each cell correspond to the student sample (G3), the second row the
parent sample (G2) and the third row the grandparent sample (G1). Factor analysis performed with a varimax
rotation.
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Chapter 4: Do Political Attitudes and Religiosity
Share a Genetic Path?
Numerous studies show religious beliefs and individual-level political attitudes are
correlated, and that religious and political beliefs are transmitted across generations. Yet
though these belief systems are clearly related within individuals and across generations, they
are conceptualized and studied as independent concepts that are exclusively products of
purposive socialization and environmental experience. As outlined earlier in this dissertation,
I challenge this traditional view with a conceptual model that explains political and religious
beliefs as being rooted in the same underlying psychological construct that reflects first
principle beliefs on social organization, resulting in mutually reinforcing beliefs in both the
political and religious realm. This model does not exclude socialization and environmental
experience as causal influences on the transmission and co-variation of political/religious
beliefs, but it does conceptualize these belief systems as inter-related rather than wholly
independent, and at least partially driven by genetic predispositions toward social order.
This framework is supported by recent studies on the heritability of political attitudes
and other individual-level traits that suggest political beliefs are not “down stream” from and
thus caused by other predispositions. For example, Verhulst, Eaves and Hatemi (2012)
demonstrate that a good portion of the correlation between personality traits and political
attitudes is due to a shared genetic path. In other words, personality traits are not exerting
causal influence on political beliefs; instead personality and political temperament constitute
predispositions that develop concurrently because they are under the same genetic
influences. This type of relationships may also occur between religious and political beliefs in
that individuals view the world in a certain way and select into religious or political
frameworks that fit with this perspective, depending on what kinds of items are on the menu
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in their environments. Previous chapters conceptualize Moral Foundations as a common
psychological construct underlying political and religious beliefs, but it is quite possible that
all three frameworks share genetic and environmental paths from which a causal order is
difficult to empirically extract. There are not many consistent, replicated heritability findings
on various religious measures often employed by political scientists (Bradshaw and Ellison
2008), and there is almost no work that attempts to explain the relationship between religion
and politics by leveraging behavior genetics to identify both genetic and environmental
influences.
The purpose of the current chapter is to explore the sources of variation within the
population, for the overlap of religious and political beliefs. There is evidence that both of
these frameworks are partially heritable, and if, indeed, a latent trait like Moral Foundations
underlie how individuals organize the world politically and religiously, it is possible that this
trait explains why these belief sets tend to go hand-in-hand. Using a classic twin design, I am
able to partition this sample’s variance into influences due to genetics, the shared
environment and the unshared environment, concluding that the source of the shared
relationship between the political and the religious is quite dependent on the measure at
hand. That is, some political and religious relationships are more due to genetics, some to
the environment and some both.
Methods and Hypotheses
Ideally, I would like to test the possibility of a shared genetic path between the Moral
Foundations, society works best battery and the religious measures employed in the previous
chapters. This would provide a more direct test of my theoretical model and allow me to
impose theoretical (if not fully empirically test) causal order on these three constructs. Due
to the necessity of dealing with secondary data, however, I am only able to test the
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heritability of political and religious beliefs; there is no accessible data set that is suitable for
heritability analysis that includes a Moral Foundations battery, and the resources required to
create such a data source are prohibitive. However, accessible data are available to test the
co-heritability of religious and political attitudes, which provides a platform for testing at
least some of the expectations derived from my theoretical model. Based on that theoretical
model, I assert that political and religious beliefs are heritable, and more importantly, that the
correlation between political and religious beliefs is at least partially explained by a common
genetic pathway.
H4.1: Part of the variance in individual political preferences and religious attitudes is explained by
a genetic source.
H4.2: Part of the covariance between political preferences and religious attitudes is due to a shared
genetic path.
Subjects
These hypotheses will be tested using a classic twin design with the Survey on Social
and Political Issues through the Minnesota Twin Family Registry8, a birth-record based
registry containing approximately 8,000 twin pairs born in Minnesota from 1936 to 1955.
The twins were recruited to the registry in middle age, from approximately 1983 to 1990.
The sample of twins for this study was born from 1947 to 1956. Thus, all of the twins in this
study were in middle age, ranging from 53 to 61 years. The Survey on Social and Political
Issues is publicly available data that was collected between July 24 and December 22, 2008,
with a second period of data collection conducted from July 13 to October 30, 2009, in
order to increase the number of complete twin pairs in the study. The University of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
[!The
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Minnesota implemented data collection, and most respondents completed a web survey. A
survey invitation was sent to the twins by postal mail with a follow-up letter sent as needed,
and a small number of respondents during the 2008 data collection completed a paper
version of the questionnaire if their Internet access was limited. During the second period of
data collection, all of the 146 respondents completed the survey by paper. All respondents
were offered $35 for completion of the survey as an incentive to complete the fairly lengthy
questionnaire (approximately 30 to 40 minutes) and as a token of appreciation. A total of
1,349 individuals completed the survey. Of these, 1,192 were members of twin pairs and 157
had a twin that did not complete the survey. The analysis for heritability is limited to the
1,192 respondents that were part of a matched twin pair.
Measures
The psychological constructs in my hypotheses have to be operationalized using the
variables available within this dataset. Because the data was collected by the same principal
investigators, the twin dataset includes the unique “society works best” (SWB) battery that
taps into bedrock principles of group life (Smith et al. 2011). The questions gave
respondents a forced choice between two options, such as “Society works best when people
live according to traditional values or people adjust their values to fit changing
circumstances.” A factor analysis on the inaugural SWB survey revealed a five-factor
solution, which Smith et al. labeled along the following dimensions:
•
•
•
•
•

!

Traditional values/moral codes
Outgroups/rulebreakers
Role of group/individual
Leadership
Absolutes
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After conducting a principal components analysis on the twin dataset, three factors emerged
with Eigen values over 1:
•
•
•

Traditional values/moral codes
Role of group/individual
Leadership

Items that loaded on the Absolutes factor in Smith et al. (2011) collapsed into the
Traditional values/Moral codes factor, and the items from Smith et al.’s
outgroups/rulebreakers factor loaded onto the Group/individual factor. The twin dataset is
a larger sample (1,171 vs. 200), and this reduced factor solution makes intuitive sense in the
way the questions combined to form three ways of thinking about how society should be
organized. Appendix B displays these factors as compared to the factor structure of the SWB
items in the student sample from Chapter 2. Aside from three items, the remaining nine
SWB items load onto three similar factors in both the large student sample collected for the
current study and the secondary data in the Minnesota Twins survey: Role of the
group/individual, traditional values and authority/leadership. That is, the division of the
items onto their respective factors demonstrates a consistent, underlying structure that also
mirrors the same types of dimensions as Smith et al. (2011).
Each item was coded -1 for the more liberal position (e.g. “Society works best when
people assume that all those in far away places are kindly”) and 1 for the more conservative
answer (e.g. “Society works best when people realize the world is dangerous”). These scores
were combined into an additive index for all items – SWB Full -- then three additive indices
were created, for the factors of SWB Values, SWB Group and SWB Leader, with the added
products of the respective items times their factor scores. Because it is theorized, and
demonstrated below, that not all political beliefs are related to religious beliefs, breaking it
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down to individual factors facilitates a more fine-tuned analysis than using the full SWB
battery.
Though political attitudes and behavior were the focus of the twin survey used in this
analysis, there were a handful of religious measures included:
•
•
•
•
•

Frequency of religious service attendance (m=3.6, SD= 1.45)
Importance of religion in one’s life (m=2.93, SD=.98)
Religious affiliation (Protestant (44%), Catholic (35%), Jewish (.83%), Other (13%)
and None (5%)
Consideration of self as evangelical or born-again Christian (18% = yes)
Consideration of self as a spiritual person, regardless of religious affiliation (86% =
yes).

Religious affiliation is excluded from this analysis because the categories are too broad to tap
into dimensions related to the overlap between religious and political beliefs as outlined
elsewhere in this dissertation. Considering oneself as born again and the importance of
religion are nearly identical measures as used in previous chapters. Church attendance was
not included in previous chapters because this dissertation is interested in the intersection of
beliefs, not behaviors, but it is included in the current analyses because its environmental
sources of variance provide an interesting contrast to the more heritable religious beliefs and
subsequent relationships with the political. Though Chapter 2 examined the overlap of
political and religious preferences by factoring the society works best and religiosity items,
that approach is not used in the current chapter as the sources of variance will vary
depending on the measure. That is, certain religious measures or political items may be more
heritable than others so collapsing them together obscures whether there is a shared genetic
path between certain items and not others.
A correlation matrix of the key phenotypes are displayed in Table 1. Most of the
society works best indices and religiosity variables are strongly and significantly correlated
with one another. The spirituality measure is an exception, partially due to its lack of
!
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variance (85% of respondents answered yes to this question), and the ambiguity of the
question itself. In prefacing the question with “regardless of religious affiliation,” it seems
the investigators were trying to capture spirituality apart from religion, but religious
respondents did not seem to interpret the question this way as there is a strong relationship
between spirituality and the importance of religion in one’s life and being born again. With
religious and non-religious people both describing themselves as spiritual, it is not surprising
the relationship with political factors is muddled. Interestingly, spirituality was the only
religious variable that was correlated with the SWB Group factor.
Similar to the findings in previous chapters, importance of religion and being born
again are positively related with the full SWB battery, SWB Values and SWB Leader, such
that higher scores on the religious measures are associated with more conservative views on
how society should work. It is unsurprising that the SWB Group factor is not significantly
related to importance and born again as communitarianism is the only religious variable
associated with the SWB Group factor in the student sample, suggesting that the
individualist religiosity measures are not overlapping with preferences for the role of the
individual and the group. SWB Leader demonstrated a similar relationship and effect size
with importance of religion in the student and twin samples, and it was also significantly
associated with views on the Bible in the student sample (which wasn’t measured in the twin
survey). In sum, there is further evidence of shared relationships between the SWB battery
and religious measures.
[Table 1 about here]
Univariate Genetic Analyses
Classic twin designs (CTD) focus on population variance, rather than population
means, in order to decompose the covariance between twins on a given trait into genetic,
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shared environmental and unique environmental components (Medland and Hatemi 2009).
A CTD is a natural experiment that uses a handful of simple assumptions to estimate these
parameters: the difference in genetic relationships between monozygotic (identical) and
dizygotic (nonidentical) twin pairs raised together and the similarity of their common
environments. Specifically, monozygotic (MZ) twins are assumed to share all genetic
variance because they come from a single fertilized egg, while dizygotic (DZ) twins (on
average) are assumed to share 50% of their genes because they come from two fertilized
eggs.
Secondly, the equal environments assumption posits that the shared environments of
twin pairs (parents, schools, friends, time period, geographic region, etc.) are assumed to
have the same influence on the phenotypes being studied, regardless of whether the twins
are MZs or DZs. Though MZ twins may be treated similarly (e.g. more likely to be dressed
alike), what is important is that this type of treatment or shared experience will not affect the
trait in question – which seems to be the case for political and social attitudes that will be
examined here (Smith et al. 2012). What varies in the model, then, is the number of genes
shared by the twin pairs. As mentioned above, MZ twins share 100% of their genes and DZ
twins share, on average, around 50% of their genes, the same as non-twin siblings. In
comparing the difference in the correlations between each MZ and DZ twin pair, higher
correlations for monozygotic twins indicate that a portion of that trait’s variance may be due
to genetic influences. If the correlations between the two types of twin pairs are very similar,
then the resemblance will be due to common environmental experiences, as all twin pairs
were raised together. Finally, if there is little relationship between twins on a certain trait, we
can conclude that unshared or unique environmental experiences are influencing that
phenotype. Figure 1 displays the path diagram of the relationships tested for each of the
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following phenotypes. Using structural equation modeling, the unit of analysis is the family
or twin pair, and the comparison of the variance decomposed into additive genetic (A),
shared environment (C) and unique environment (E) components from MZ to DZ twins is
akin to the between-groups and within-groups comparison in an ANOVA (Medland and
Hatemi 2009; Smith et al. 2012).
Using OpenMx for R (Boker et al. 2011), the phenotypes in this study were
decomposed into A-C-E. The additive genetic component explains how much of the
similarities between individuals on a specific trait are due to “gene-based predispositions,
needs, wants, desires, or motivations” (Bradshaw and Ellison 2008, 531). The shared
environment accounts for the portion of similarity that stems from twins raised within the
same families and reflects all of the influences in their environment that they have in
common. The unique or nonshared environment refers to any experience that is not shared
between the twins, whether it is differences realized during childhood or as adults. The “E”
term also encompasses measurement error in the model. Structural equation modeling was
used to develop a saturated model, then a full ACE, AE, CE and finally E. The latter modelfitting process allows for measures of statistical significance to provide confidence in the
results. That is, if the full ACE model is not significantly different from the fully estimated,
saturated model, then we can be more confident in the results produced from this wellfitting model. If we drop the various other components (A, C or E), model fit may be
improved or deteriorate.
[Figure 1 about here]
Univariate analysis conducted on spirituality, born again and the society works best
battery and its factors are displayed in Table 2. A maximum likelihood estimation revealed
the A-E model was not significantly different from a saturated model or the A-C-E model
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(as indicated by the p value), making it the best fit for the data for each of the phenotypes,
except for spirituality and the society works best leadership dimension, because of the lack
of variance in each of these measures to partition across A-C-E. Supporting earlier findings
on the heritability of religiosity, church attendance is more due to the environment, both
shared and unique (Truett et al. 1992), while the variance in the importance of religion in
guiding one’s life is divided between additive genetics and the unique environment and being
born again is split between all three (Bradshaw and Ellison 2008). This reflects what
Bradshaw and Ellison (2008, 538) refer to as the more internal dimensions of religiosity that
probably stem from genetic influences/predispositions and are “less responsive to social
factors” and the external expressions of religiosity, such as church attendance, that are more
likely impacted by “environmental pressures.”
The society works best index also performed as expected, with strong genetic effects.
When broken down into the three factors of SWB, the group/individual and traditional
values/moral code dimensions demonstrated significant genetic effects while variance on the
leadership dimension seems mostly due to environment. This may be because there was very
little variance on the leadership questions, with 80 to 90% of respondents answering in the
“liberal” direction on the two questions. In sum, this population replicates findings
demonstrated elsewhere in the heritability of religiosity and political attitudes and supports
Hypothesis 4.1.
[Table 2 about here]
Multivariate Genetic Analyses
Because the SWB and religiosity phenotypes are correlated and variance on each
measure is partially due to genetics, there is a good chance the correlation between the
various measures is due to a shared genetic path. Using a bivariate correlated factors model
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in OpenMx (Neale and Cardon 1992), I tested the shared relationships between the SWB
and religious variables that demonstrated strong, significant relationships with each other,
which essentially included SWB Values and importance of religion, being born again and
church attendance.9 The Values factor of SWB has the largest effect size of the factors and
as compared to the full battery so it is probably driving the relationship with the religious
variables. Without a strong correlation between the phenotypes, exploring the shared
sources of this correlation does not carry much meaning so bivariate analyses were not
performed on the remaining items from Table 2 (for a justification of this approach see
Verhulst, Eaves and Hatemi 2012). A correlated factors model was selected over a bivariate
Cholesky decomposition because the latter should only be used when theory dictates that
one phenotype precedes another (Rice, van den Bree and Thapar 2004) or longitudinal data
is being used (e.g. testing direction of causality between personality and political attitudes,
see Verhulst, Eaves and Hatemi 2012).
The bivariate analysis partitions variance into unique A-C-E components for each
trait as well as calculating how much of the correlation between the traits is due to variance
from common additive genetics, the shared environment and the unshared environment.
Each of the following figures display a path diagram with the respective coefficients for each
trait pair as well as a table of fit statistics and a table of the division of the correlation
between A-C-E. The latter proportions are calculated by multiplying the univariate path
coefficients with each other and the correlation between the two. For example, in Figure 2,
the square root of .41 would be multiplied times the A correlation of .51 and then by the
square root of .39. The same would be done for the C and E components, with the products
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
\!The individual ACE path values for each phenotype will shift slightly depending on which other variables are
included in the model.
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added to the A value from the previous sentence. Dividing these products by the total of all
three results in the proportion of the correlation due to each source.
[Figures 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 about here]
As displayed in Figure 2, the shared relationship between the importance of religion
and the SWB Values factor (r=.32) is divided between additive genetics (63%) and unique
environment (37%). The r is simply the standardized measure of covariance between the two
phenotypes, and this model portions that covariance such that the majority of the shared
relationship, within the population, is due to genetic influences. Figure 3 displays the
relationship between SWB Values and born again, demonstrating that the same basic effect
size (r=.33) is explained about equally by genetic, shared and unique environmental effects.
Conversely, a genetic path (13%) explains very little of the correlation between SWB Values
and church attendance (r=.30), as most of this relationship is partioned into shared (60%)
and unique (27%) environments. A bivariate model of church attendance and importance of
religion reveals a high correlation (r=.58) that is due almost equally to genes (33%), shared
(31%) and unique (36%) environments; church attendance and born again (r=.32) is
explained similarly (A=40%, C=34% and E=25%); and finally born again and importance of
religion (.33) is mostly explained by genetics (65%) while shared (13%) and unique (22%)
environment contribute less. Except for church attendance, which is more a behavior than a
belief, these findings support Hypothesis 4.2; the covariance between political and religious
atitudes are due, at least in part, to shared genetic influences. This suggests that there is a
latent, heritable trait or set of traits that influence both the religious and the political, which
could explain why these belief systems tend to overlap and reinforce one another within
individuals and families.
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Discussion
Beyond understanding a possible innate predisposition that manifests in both
political and religious beliefs, accounting for genetic sources of variance allows for better
examination of environmental influences on these frameworks. As the first examination of a
shared genetic path between political and religious beliefs, these results are not definitive but
certainly suggest that the origins of the overlap between religious and political beliefs is very
complex. The relationship between importance of religion in guiding one’s daily decisions
and political attitudes on moral issues in society seems mostly to evolve from a genetic
predisposition, plus some unique experiences, that demonstrate preferences regarding order,
traditional values and external authority; whereas frequency of church attendance – though
highly correlated with religious importance – is more likely to be associated with these
conservative societal preferences because of the common environment. That is, children
develop the habit of going to religious services from their parents, where it is possible
conservative belief sets are being advocated and accepted.
Because of the high correlation between religious service attendance and importance
of religion, both genetic and environmenal factors are likely contributing to attitudes on
organizing society. If the heritability of the overlapping political and religious attitudes can
be thought of as the “ability to think or behave in accordance with one’s internal, biological
motivations” (Bradshaw and Ellison 2008), adding the reinforcement of an external behavior
like church attendance may further strengthen or augment these beliefs, such that individuals
high, or very low, on all levels of religiosity may demonstrate more consistent and possibly
more stable attitudes in the political realm. Of course, this is assuming that somehow religion
comes before politics, which is not necessarily the case. It is possible that religious attitudes
and behaviors are merely expressions of a certain set of predispositions that would also
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encompass social order, depending on when and what types of belief frameworks are
introduced in one’s environment.
The findings from this chapter support the general theoretical argument of this
dissertation that part of the reason religious and political beliefs covary is due to an
underlying disposition; a disposition which is partially innate. The previous chapter
suggested that all five Moral Foundations may not be stable across generations, and I am
unable to test the heritability of this framework in the current data. However, some of the
strongest results from Chapter 2 are the associations between Authority, Purity, importance
of religion and the society works best items, and in the heritability analysis, the traditional
values/moral code dimension of societal preferences shared a genetic path with religious
importance. Because notions of Purity and Authority could be conceived as fitting within
this SWB value framework, and they are also the two most consistent Moral Foundations
shared within the families in Chapter 3, it’s possible that these moral intuitions – or similar
constructs – underlie the shared covariance between religious and poltiical beliefs. This
would support some of the most replicated value trait findings in behavior genetics research
– what Bouchard (2009, 169; Koenig and Bouchard 2006) refers to as the “Traditional Moral
Values Triad” (TMVT), which includes:
•

Authoritarianism (How families should be organized)

•

Religiousness (Who controls the universe)

•

Conservatism (How societies should be organized)

Though Bouchard never tested a possible shared genetic pathway between these three
constructs, evidence from the current analysis provide support for the idea of a
predisposition toward traditionalism, which may manifest in political and religious beliefs
and explain their overlap in American society. The mixed results in previous chapters,
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combined with the findings in the current chapter, suggest that there is a latent trait that
explains part of the variance in political and religious beliefs, but this trait, or set of traits,
may not be Moral Foundations – at least not all five of them. If Moral Foundations are not
heritable and also do not run in families from a socialization perspective, than an individual’s
unique environment is more influential on these traits, which has some interesting
implications for how Foundations may be pushed around by outside influences. These
implications and suggestions for future directions will be discussed in the final chapter of
this dissertation.
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Table 1: Bivariate correlations of religious and political phenotypes

Importance
of Religion

Attend

Spiritual

Born
again

Full
SWB

SWB
SWB
SWB
Group Values Leader

Importance
of Religion
Attendance

.58***

Spiritual

.40***

.28***

Born again

.34***

.33***

.15***

Full SWB

.18***

.17***

.00

.22***

-.03

-.04

-.09**

.02

.32***

.31***

.10***

.35*** .77***

.30***

.12***

.13***

.02

.11*** .46***

.16***

SWB
Group
SWB
Values
SWB
Leader

Note: ***p<.001; **p<.01, *p<.05
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.80***

.26***

!
Figure 1: Univariate ACE Model
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Table 2: Univariate Genetic and Environmental Estimates and Model Fitting for
Political and Religious Phenotypes

!

A

C

E

-2LL
Saturated
AE

df
Saturated
AE

p

Importance of Religion

.43

.04

.52

3164.21
3167.92

1153
1162

.93

Attendance

.23

.29

.48

4045.99
4049.19

1153
1162

.95

Spiritual

.25

.00

.75

840.82
850.89

1312
1315

.02

Born Again

.43

.30

.28

1246.47
1248.56

1503
1504

.15

Society Works Best

.42

.00

.58

7781.97
7784.43

1314
1317

.48

SWB Group

.42

.00

.58

6471.32
6472.75

1321
1324

.70

SWB Values

.39

.00

.61

6142.27
6142.46

1316
1319

.98

SWB Leader

.08

.11

.81

3951.91
3960.84

1326
1329

.03
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Figure 2: Bivariate ACE Model for Religious Importance and SWB Values

Model Fit Statistics
-2LL

Df

AIC

p

Saturated

8518.82

2620

3278.82

ACE

8533.22

2637

3259.22

.64

Proportion of correlation shared by
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Correlation

A

C

E

.32

.63

0

.37
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Figure 3: Bivariate ACE Model for Born Again and SWB Values

Model Fit Statistics
-2LL

Df

AIC

Saturated

6041.05

2804

433.05

ACE

6052.16

2821

410.16

p
.85

Proportion of correlation shared by
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Correlation

A

C

E

.33

.36

.36

.27
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Figure 4: Bivariate ACE Model for Church Attendance and SWB Values

Model Fit Statistics
-2LL

df

AIC

p

Saturated

9526.42

2620

4286.42

ACE

9535.92

2637

4261.92

.92

Proportion of correlation shared by
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Correlation

A

C

E

.30

.13

.60

.27
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Figure 5: Bivariate ACE Model for Religious Importance and Church Attendance

Model Fit Statistics
-2LL

Df

AIC

p

Saturated

7676.79

2616

2444.79

ACE

7693.82

2633

2427.82

.45

Proportion of correlation shared by
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Correlation

A

C

E

.58

.33

.31

.36
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Figure 6: Bivariate ACE Model for Born Again and Church Attendance

Model Fit Statistics
-2LL

Df

AIC

Saturated

5584.73

2800

-15.27

ACE

5593.76

2817

-40.24

p
.94

Proportion of correlation shared by
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Correlation

A

C

E

.32

.40

.34

.25
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Figure 7: Bivariate ACE Model for Born Again and Importance of Religion

Model Fit Statistics
-2LL

Df

AIC

p

Saturated

4579.86

2800

-1020.14

ACE

4597.24

2817

-1036.76

Proportion of correlation shared by
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Correlation

A

C

E

.33

.65

.13

.22

.43
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
The political and religious are demonstrably intertwined in American politics and
within the preferences of individual citizens, and “though there have been studies on
political socialization and other studies on religious socialization, little work has been done to
relate the two” (Pearson-Merkowitz and Gimpel 2009, 172). This dissertation has attempted
to examine possible theoretical reasons for the overlap and sources of development of these
belief systems within individuals and across generations. The primary contribution of this
dissertation in terms of theoretical development was to conceptualize the overlap between
political and religious beliefs as being rooted in a single underlying psychological construct.
This underlying construct was conceptualized and operationalized by employing the
framework of Moral Foundations Theory. Treating religious and political beliefs as twin
manifestations of a single underlying psychological construct is a stark contrast with the
existing literature, which conceptualizes religious and political beliefs as related but
independent concepts. This basic conceptual model was used to generate a key set of
hypotheses. The first set of these hypotheses proposes that the intersection of political and
religious preferences is explained by an underlying belief set related to moral intuitions -Haidt and Graham’s Moral Foundations theory. Specifically, Ingroup, Authority and Purity
are associated with an individualist orientation comprised of conservative preferences for
organizing society and an individual approach toward religion. Conversely, Harm and
Fairness are associated with a communitarian orientation that results in liberal political views
and an emphasis on serving others over personal piety in religious beliefs.
If Moral Foundations explain the overlap of political and religious beliefs in
individuals, what are the possible sources of these beliefs? The second set of hypotheses
posit that religious, political and moral preferences are transmitted in families, such that the
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passage of Moral Foundations explains why certain political and religious beliefs are
socialized. Finally, the third set of hypotheses predict that part of the variance in religious
and political beliefs is explained by genetics and that the correlation between the beliefs sets
is also partially due to a shared genetic path. In sum, different Moral Foundations are
associated with different preferences for organizing society and approaching religion;
grandparents, parents and children share many political and religious beliefs, though not
Moral Foundations; and genetics influence part of the variance on religious and political
preferences and part of their overlap is due to a shared genetic path.
Limitations
There are a number of limitations on the analyses presented in this dissertation that
place caveats on the findings and inferences presented here. The single biggest source of
such constraints is data limitation. The current results may only explain these sets of
relationships for white, middle class American Christians with children in college in the
Midwest. A more representative sample from different strata of socio-economic status,
various races and ethnicities and different religious traditions would provide external validity
to the suggestion that religious and political beliefs are shared in families and possibly
explained by Moral Foundations in individuals. Race and socio-economic status certainly
could influence these relationships and the passage within families as well (Schwadel 2008;
Smith 2005). The findings here certainly suggest that it is possible that Moral Foundations
underlie the relationship between political and religious beliefs for American Christians, but
this may not extend to other religions within the United States or Christians in other
cultures.
Data constraints are particularly notable in terms of drawing firm inferences about
the intergenerational transmission of these belief systems. The extremely small sample of
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intact three generations on both sides of the family (n=8) made it nearly impossible to draw
definitive conclusions about the transmission of political and religious preferences and moral
intuitions between spouses, between generations and across in-laws. With the effect sizes
found in the current data, fully testing the conceptual model would require a sample size of
100 to 200 intact family units for adequate power. As there is no accessible twin data set that
includes a Moral Foundations battery as well as measures of political and religious beliefs, I
am unable to test a key implication of my theoretical framework—that Moral Foundations
are heritable, and it is these heritable phenotypes that at least partially carries political and
religious belief systems across generations. Because of the inability to test the heritability of
Moral Foundations and the inconsistent relationships within families and difference in
means between generations, it is difficult to speculate whether these intuitions just are not
innate or socialized from parent to child or if they change across time within individuals.
Despite unavoidable data limitations, however, this dissertation makes several
important contributions. It integrates theories and measures from political science,
psychology, sociology and behavior genetics into a single, comprehensive framework in an
attempt to explain the intersection of religion and politics. It provides empirical tests of core
hypotheses drawn from this theoretical framework. In doing so, it employs unique samples
(three generation) and analytical techniques (multivariate heritability analysis) rarely
employed in political science that provide important insights. Though the empirical results
are mixed regarding the theoretical précis argued here, the leverage of multiple samples,
extended family units of analysis and a variety of measured constructs present further insight
into the origins and development of ideology in American politics.
The Covariance of Religious and Political Beliefs within Individuals
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Chapter 2 suggests that Haidt and Graham’s Moral Foundations for decision-making

may, as theorized, be part of a core underlying disposition within individuals that leads to
particular political and religious orientations: with communitarianism guided by notions of
Harm and Fairness and individualism guided by Ingroup, Authority and Purity. Specifically,
the five Foundations are predictive of the dimension of religio-political orientations related
to the role of the group and individual, preferences for traditional values in society and
whether avoiding sin or helping others is more important when trying to be a better
Christian. Ingroup, Authority and Purity are associated with conservative political views and
a propensity to believe in “personal piety” rather than “serving others” (Mockabee et al.
forthcoming, 2), and Harm and Fairness predict liberal societal preferences and an emphasis
on helping other people in pursuit of being a better Christian. But these relationships mostly
held for the large student sample, and not for the G1 and G2 samples.
Authority and Purity predicted an individualist orientation, which only included the
measures of individual religiosity (and one multi-vocal SWB item regarding living by
traditional values). These relationships suggest that the importance of religion in one’s life,
views on the Bible and being born again may be associated with political beliefs but are
orthogonal to the underlying, latent factors in how individuals in this sample wish to
organize society (at least as measured through the SWB battery). Some of these findings
were replicated in all three samples – G1, G2 and G3 – though many of the models were
limited by power problems due to small n’s. Generally, though, the analyses provide a small
amount of evidence that Moral Foundations are associated with political and religious
preferences, in the direction predicted by the theoretical argument and hypotheses developed
in this dissertation. Traditionally, political and religious preferences have been treated as
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related to one another, but two separate ideological frameworks for understanding the
world.
Chapter 2’s analysis intimates that part of the reason the religious and political
intersect within individuals is because they may be informed by basic moral intuitions that
guide how people judge right and wrong. Because there is a difference in which Moral
Foundations individuals rely upon (Haidt, Graham and Nosek 2009), the configuration of
Foundations in a person’s moral framework may manifest in specific political and religious
beliefs. Individuals who place more importance on intuitions related to Ingroup, Authority
and Purity may be attracted to conservative political views that reflect these values and an
individual style of Christianity that emphasizes personal responsibility and a personal
relationship with God more than an outward, serving others mentality. Conversely,
preferences for Harm and Fairness in guiding moral decisions may be related to liberal views
on organizing society, in that rulebreakers should be forgiven and we should care for the
unfortunate. Harm and Fairness also are associated with a person’s approach to religion,
whether it is inwardly (avoiding sin) or outwardly focused (helping others).
These findings provide some insight into why Americans who believe in the same
God and read the same holy book often talk past one another. If one believes that personal
accountability through the guidance of Ingroup, Authority and Purity norms is the way to
achieve a well-functioning society (Emerson and Smith 2000; Graham and Haidt 2010),
there will be an emphasis on individual-level behavior and improving the state of the world
through personal relationships – not structural changes. With an individualistic view of
morality and social change, it is thought that people need to choose for themselves what is
right, and work on one-on-one relationship-building in converting others to Christ will lead
to social change (Smith et al. 1998; Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2007, 234). Several “culture
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war” issues escape this apolitical approach, including abortion and same-sex marriage, in that
even if they are personal choices, these choices are thought to negatively affect society
(Hunter 1991; Smith et al. 1998, 200; Adams 1997; Koleva et al. 2012). These issues also may
feel like a direct violation of concerns for Purity and Authority; whereas government
intervention on behalf of racial reparations or economic disparities do not tap into key Moral
Foundations for conservatives and so are thought to be a matter of personal responsibility
(Emerson and Smith 2000; McAdams et al. 2008).
On the other hand, individuals with strong preferences for Harm and Fairness in
guiding their moral decisions may take a communitarian approach to religion and politics.
With religious leanings geared more toward serving other people than personal piety and
liberal political views that emphasize egalitarianism and social justice, these individuals are
less concerned about personal wrongdoing and believe society works best when people think
beyond themselves and help other people. Of course, dividing an entire population into two
categories is probably unrealistic, with most folks falling somewhere in between strict
individualism or communitarianism. But the continued development and exploration of
these general orientations may help us better understand how people face the same moral
decisions, see the same society, read the same Bible – all in very different ways. Very
disparate policy preferences emerge when one factors in worldviews that emphasize society
functioning properly when individuals take care of their own problems versus the
responsibility of the community to address individual needs (Leege 1988; Emerson and
Smith 2000). Graham and Haidt (2010) may see Ingroup, Authority and Purity as religion’s
binding foundations toward community-building, but this dissertation suggests that because
liberals are less concerned with these Foundations (Graham, Haidt and Nosek 2009;
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McAdams et al. 2008; Koleva et al. 2012), Harm and Fairness serve as their “binding” values
in both the religious and political realms.
The Covariance of Political and Religious Beliefs Across Generations
If Moral Foundations may explain the overlap of political and religious preferences
within individuals, how are these intuitions developed? The basic expectation drawn from
my conceptual model is that Moral Foundations should co-vary across as well as within
generations at least partially through a process of socialization. Political and religious beliefs
are also expected to run in families as they are often explained as a product of family
socialization. If these latter belief systems are indeed rooted in an underlying psychological
construct represented by Moral Foundations, then clearly all three key variables—Moral
Foundations, political beliefs and religious beliefs—should co-vary within and across
generations. The analyses of this dissertation point to mixed results on these expectations.
Examining bivariate associations across generations uncovered consistent, positive
relationships for political preferences within families, but the associations were sporadic for
religious preferences (notably these sorts of beliefs in generation three seemed to reflect a
gender effect from the second and first generations).
As most socialization studies have uncovered, partisanship is the strongest
association between generations, but there were also positive relationships, mostly, on the
society works best battery for broad principles in organizing group life. The broad measure
of importance of religion in guiding one’s day-to-day decisions was the most consistent
religious preference shared between generations, followed by views on the Bible.
Communitarianism demonstrated puzzling results in that mothers and sons are positively
associated but mothers and daughters are negatively related, and fathers do not have
significant relationships either way with their children. This measure is still relatively new,
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and with a forced, dichotomous choice, there may not be enough potential variance in the
measure to uncover the underlying construct’s association. It is also possible that the
communitarian orientation is influenced by other factors or socialized outside of the family.
Regarding Moral Foundations, simple means tests and exploratory factor analyses
uncovered significant differences in both the scores attributed to each Foundation and the
actual factor dimensions, between and across the three generations. With the widespread
replication of findings on the Moral Foundations framework across samples in various
countries, it seems to be a vetted measure – at least at the aggregate level across a
population. What seems to be happening in the current data is some sort of age effect:
concerns for each Foundation increases with the age of the cohorts in this sample, and there
are especially large differences on Authority and Purity, such that the grandparents find these
Foundations most relevant. The theoretical framework used in this dissertation
conceptualized Moral Foundations as a stable and universal set of dimensions for the simple
reason that this is how Moral Foundations Theory presents those dimensions. The findings
in this dissertation at least raise the possibility that this assumption—implicitly central to
Moral Foundations Theory—may not be correct. Some of the findings may be due to the
limitations of data discussed above, but an alternate explanation is that what Haidt and
Graham refer to as our innate, intuitive ethical systems either change with age or are
significantly influenced by the larger cultural context of generational cohorts.
In most of the Haidt and Graham work, age is used as an independent variable,
along with Moral Foundations, in predicting another variable of interest. There have been no
longitudinal studies to determine whether Moral Foundations are stable across one’s life
course, similar to the Big 5 Personality traits, or if they change over time. That is, when the
G3 students of the current study become parents and eventually grandparents, will their
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concerns for Purity and Authority increase? Or will each cohort moving forward, at least in
modernizing societies, have less and less concern for the binding foundations of Ingroup,
Authority and Purity? For example, a recent Pew Research Center survey (October 2009)
indicates an age divide for support for same-sex marriage, with 58% of 18-29-year-olds in
favor, as compared to 38% of 30-49-year-olds and 35% of 50-64-year-olds.10 Support for gay
marriage has been associated with notions of purity and attitudes toward disgust (Inbar et al.
2009a; Smith et al. 2010; Balzer and Jacobs 2011); so is it the case that younger individuals
are not as concerned with purity or that they do not associate gay marriage with
disgust/purity?
If the latter is the case, than broad orientations may be transmitted within families
but manifest themselves differently when applied to issues of the day. Several previous
studies have demonstrated that value transmission is enhanced when parental views match
the public mood or surrounding society (Jennings and Niemi 1974). Some issue attitudes,
like race relations, seem to be shaped more by societal influences, or the prevailing
“Zeitgeist,” if it is in opposition to parental views (Beck and Jennings 1991, 757; Niemi and
Jennings 1991; Jennings and Niemi 1974). For example, Jennings and Niemi (1974) found
the largest discrepancies between parent and child attitudes on issues like busing and
segregation – civil rights issues that definitely have a generational component similar to that
of gay rights today. What is unknown, then, is whether different generations apply different
Moral Foundations to their political and religious preferences. When thinking about gay
marriage, do the G3 individuals rely upon notions of Fairness and G1 on notions of Purity?
Indeed, the mean differences between generations on the “binding” Foundations suggest
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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that Harm and Fairness concerns may be more relevant to younger generations than notions
of Authority and Purity, yet the older generations seem to score at relatively the same level
for all five Foundations.
A larger portion of G1 and G2 than G3 also reported that religion provided a “great
deal of guidance” in their lives and that avoiding sin was more important than helping others
in trying to be a good Christian. Because of the significant relationship between religious
importance, the binding Moral Foundations and conservative preferences for how society
works best, it is possible that increases in religiosity is associated with increases in
conservatism and Authority and Purity. Graham and Haidt (2010) suggest that moral
communities, or religious institutions, teach and encourage the binding foundations so
perhaps gains in religiosity over the life course, or in different cohorts, leads to higher scores
on concerns for Ingroup, Authority and Purity. Conversely, individuals or generations that
place a higher value on these Foundations may be more attracted to certain brands of
religiosity, like an individualist orientation that seeks to avoid sin and rely on an external
code to guide behavior. Without a longitudinal analysis, it is impossible to untangle causality,
but these findings suggest that because Moral Foundations are associated with religious and
political beliefs within individuals but are not shared across generations, perhaps the
Foundations develop from unique experiences outside of the family, but may be learned or
reinforced by political and religious preferences that are transmitted. For example, a child
may learned that religion is an important guide for decision making from his or her parents
but then may choose to attend a church that emphasizes different Moral Foundations than
that of the parents. It is also possible that the religious and political preferences shared in
families are partially due to genetic influences, and thus more likely to be passed along than
Moral Foundations, with unknown heritability estimates.
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Regardless of what is driving the mixed findings on Moral Foundations, the simple

fact of the inconsistency raises an issue with the key causal element of my theoretical
framework. The theory identified Moral Foundations as a likely candidate for the
psychological construct underlying political and religious beliefs, and, as such, it would track
across generations with religious and political beliefs. The data do little to confirm this
expectation.
The Heritability of the Covariance of Political and Religious Beliefs
In the first study to suggest and test shared sources of influence on political and religious
preferences, the heritability analysis in this dissertation reveals a large portion of the
covariance between the importance of religion in one’s life and preferences for values that
organize society is due to a shared genetic influence. There also is a significant overlap
between church attendance and political preferences that is mostly due to environmental
influences. Thus, individuals may have an innate predisposition toward political
conservatism and guidance from religion, but these orientations are likely reinforced through
behaviors like participation in religious institutions. If political and religious beliefs originate
from an innate trait or set of traits, this provides support for the theoretical argument of this
dissertation – that there is an underlying disposition that explains an individual’s broad
orientation toward organizing society, approaching the world and understanding human
nature. What is unknown is whether Moral Foundations are heritable and/or share a genetic
pathway with political or religious beliefs or if it is merely one more framework that is
influenced by the latent trait that explains part of the overlap between political and religious
beliefs. The findings discussed in the previous section would seem to dampen expectations
that Moral Foundations will be highly heritable.
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Whether this underlying disposition exhibits political, religious or both belief sets,

then, is dependent on an individual’s exposure to these environments. As mentioned earlier,
a 1980s study in the USSR (McFarland 1998) determined that applying a religiosity battery to
attitudes toward the Communist Party predicted the same relationships with social
preferences as those identified when these measurements were used with American
Christians. This provides more evidence for predispositions toward social order, underlying
religious and political beliefs that are dependent or “activated” by one’s environment.
Certain individuals may have a psychological propensity to approach life based on an
organized set of beliefs, and whether this manifests in a religion, political party or something
else depends upon where they were born, how they were raised and what they encounter as
adults. Some individuals will become political, some religious, some both and some neither.
Findings along these lines could contribute to our understanding of what drives individual
political attitudes, how this contributes to the formation and shifts in public opinion and
ultimately whether instantiated political-religious predispositions, much like personality, may
drive political disagreement and conflict.
Future Directions
Even with the sizable limitations of the current study, the evidence presented here
certainly calls for follow-up research to better understand the intersection of religion and
politics and how these belief systems are relayed within families. Findings in the socialization
literature have suggested that there are a number of mediating and moderating variables that
can affect transmission of values within families. For example, a child’s accurate perception
of parental beliefs leads to more agreement on those beliefs (Okagaki and Bevis 1999); the
quality and closeness of the parent-grandparent relationship – while growing up and as
adults – are strong predictors of the grandchild-grandparent relationship and value sharing
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(Mueller and Elder 2003; Whitbeck, Hoyt and Huck 1993); and a parent’s level of political
interest influences the transmission of political attitudes and partisanship (Beck and Jennings
1975; Jennings and Niemi 1974). Collecting a larger sample of intact, three-generation family
units would allow for the exploration of these mediating factors, to better understand what
kinds of political and religious preferences are shared within families and whether this is
possibly due to a “multiplier” effect where parent-child agreement increases when the
parents come from similar households. The presence of agreement in families with little
contact between G1 and G3 could then suggest that these specific political and religious
preferences are not necessarily purposefully socialized, but may result from general
transmission of broader orientations – like moral intuitions – that may be socialized or
possibly heritable.
The next step, then, would be to conduct a heritability analysis of Moral Foundations
to investigate the sources of these intuitions. If they are somewhat innate and related to
political and religious beliefs, there may be evidence for an overall, general orientation to
how individuals approach nearly every aspect of their lives – from the personal to the
political. If, however, Moral Foundations are mostly influenced by the environment –
whether shared within families or unique to individuals – then it is more likely that religious
institutions and other societal structures are “teaching” these Foundations, and individuals
are adopting them because they are consistent with the rest of their belief frameworks. A
recent study on cognition and Moral Foundations suggests that when under cognitive stress,
conservatives suppress the binding Foundations of Ingroup, Authority and Purity and are
more likely to highlight concerns of Harm and Fairness, similar to their liberal counterparts
(Wright and Baril 2011). If simple cognitive overload in a lab experiment, completely
unrelated to moral decisions, can shift an individual’s Moral Foundations, it is possible that
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the Foundations are more of a learned behavior susceptible to change than an innate
disposition. Yet, there is something about conservatives that cause them to emphasize all
five Moral Foundations when they are not under duress, and something that leads liberals to
always prefer Harm and Fairness.
The theoretical framework of this dissertation suggested that a third thing, Moral
Foundations, explains the overlap of political and religious preferences, but instead, there
may be a “fourth” construct that informs all three frameworks. Moral Foundations may be
just as much a “menu” item as religious and political beliefs, orientations and affiliations in
that the Foundations are taught alongside the other belief sets in one’s environment. In
other words, it may not be the case that individuals are politically conservative or religiously
individualistic because they value Ingroup, Authority and Purity. Another predisposition,
whether it be personality, personal values or a construct yet to be uncovered and/or
measured, may lead an individual to adopt specific political or religious preferences, that in
turn come with a set of Moral Foundations that justify these beliefs. As argued elsewhere in
this dissertation, those with a liberal disposition may view Harm and Fairness as the
Foundations that bind communities together by forcing individuals to help others in an
egalitarian manner. For those with a conservative disposition, however, the way society
works best is for individuals to take personal responsibility and refrain from doing wrong
themselves by obeying Authority, being loyal to the Ingroup and seeking Purity.
Most scholarship exploring the nature of religious and political beliefs divide the
world into political liberals and conservatives or religious modernists and traditionalists, but
this dissertation suggests there may be an even broader orientation that shapes the lens
through which individuals view the world. Whether this orientation is socialized, heritable or
a combination of both, understanding that moral decisions and political and religious
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preferences shape and are shaped by this orientation may help explain the “culture wars” in
American society (Hunter 1991). Examining the intersection of these frameworks across
generations also may untangle why public opinion toward something like abortion remains
stable across time and cohorts but attitudes toward gay marriage are changing. Do religious
beliefs and general political preferences remain stable but the way in which individuals apply
them to one another varies? Do the differences in moral frameworks between generations or
over one’s life course explain attitude change? Investigating this psychology behind political
and religious ideologies will provide better insight into the reasons people believe and act the
way they do as well as understanding the stability of beliefs across generations and, therefore,
of the relative intractability of people’s positions on controversial issues.
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Appendix A: Survey Instruments
Moral Foundations Questionnaire: 20-Item Short Version
Item Key, July 200811
--Below are the items that compose the MFQ20. Variable names are IN CAPS
--Besides the 20 test items there are 2 “catch” items, MATH and GOOD
--For more information about the theory, or to print out a version of this scale formatted for
participants, or to learn about scoring this scale, please see: www.moralfoundations.org
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------PART 1 ITEMS (responded to using the following response options: not at all relevant, not
very relevant, slightly relevant, somewhat relevant, very relevant, extremely relevant)
MATH - Whether or not someone was good at math [This item is not scored; it is included
both to force people to use the bottom end of the scale, and to catch and cut participants
who respond with 3 or above]
Harm:
EMOTIONALLY - Whether or not someone suffered emotionally
WEAK - Whether or not someone cared for someone weak or vulnerable
Fairness:
TREATED - Whether or not some people were treated differently than others
UNFAIRLY - Whether or not someone acted unfairly
Ingroup:
LOVECOUNTRY - Whether or not someone’s action showed love for his or her country
BETRAY - Whether or not someone did something to betray his or her group
Authority:
RESPECT - Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect for authority
TRADITIONS - Whether or not someone conformed to the traditions of society
Purity:
DECENCY - Whether or not someone violated standards of purity and decency
DISGUSTING - Whether or not someone did something disgusting
PART 2 ITEMS (responded to using the following response options: strongly disagree,
moderately disagree, slightly disagree, slightly agree, moderately agree, strongly agree)
GOOD – It is better to do good than to do bad. [Not scored, included to force use of top of
the scale, and to catch and cut people who respond with first 3 response options]
Harm:
COMPASSION - Compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial virtue.
ANIMAL - One of the worst things a person could do is hurt a defenseless animal.
Fairness:
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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FAIRLY - When the government makes laws, the number one principle should be
ensuring that everyone is treated fairly.
JUSTICE – Justice is the most important requirement for a society.
Ingroup:
HISTORY - I am proud of my country’s history.
FAMILY - People should be loyal to their family members, even when they have done
something wrong.
Authority:
KIDRESPECT - Respect for authority is something all children need to learn.
SEXROLES - Men and women each have different roles to play in society.
Purity:
HARMLESSDG - People should not do things that are disgusting, even if no one is
harmed.
UNNATURAL - I would call some acts wrong on the grounds that they are unnatural.
Society Works Best Instrument
SWB1: Society works best when…
1-People realize the world is dangerous
-1-People assume all those in far away places are kindly
SWB2: Society works best when…
1-Leaders are obeyed
-1-Leaders are questioned
SWB3: Society works best when…
1-Established ideas are favored.
-1-New ideas are favored
SWB4: Society works best when…
1-We take care of our own people first
-1-We realize that people everywhere deserve our help
SWB5: Society works best when…
-1-Leaders compromise with their opponents in order to get things done
1-Leaders adhere to their principles no matter what
SWB6: Society works best when…
1-People live according to traditional values
-1-People adjust their values to fit changing circumstances
SWB7: Society works best when…
1-People take primary responsibility for their welfare
-1-People join together to help others
SWB8: Society works best when…
1-It speaks with one voice
!

!
-1-It speaks with many voices
SWB9: Society works best when…
1-People recognize the unavoidable flaws of human nature
-1-People recognize that humans can be changed in positive ways
SWB10: Society works best when…
1-Every member contributes the same amount
-1-More fortunate members contribute more in order to help others
SWB11: Society works best when…
1-Behavioral expectations are based on an external code
-1-Behavioral expectations are allowed to evolve over the decades
SWB12: Society works best when…
1-Those who break the rules are punished
-1-Those who break the rules are forgiven
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Appendix B:
Society Works Best Factor Structures for Student and Twin
Samples
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